From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: August 28, 2000 12:00:52 PM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Emails to follow/wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800**

Dear Mr. Young, 28 Aug 00

Following are several emails regarding the evidence which supports the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800. Please evaluate. Please contact me for further clarification.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 27, 2000 12:14:42 PM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Still trying**

Dear Public Aviation Safety Officials, (Key word Safety)

27 Sep 00

You are about to approve a probable cause for TWA 800 as spontaneous center tank explosion. You admit the essential ignition source is unknown. You can not explain the 'streak' and dismiss it.

So, you have a probable cause that two important ingredients actually refute, missing ignition source and perceived streak.

There exists a probable cause that fully includes those two essential ingredients: Wiring/Cargo door rupture leading to explosive decompression; an explanation supported by photographs of ruptures at midspan latches of forward cargo door.

And you know it.

Wiring/cargo door includes the streak as evening setting orange sun reflecting off pieces of forward fuselage on the right side to surprised observers on the ground and perceived as a 'streak'.

Wiring/cargo door includes the fiery engine number three igniting the disintegrating center tank as the wreckage falls after the nose comes off.

And you know it.

The orange sun does reflect off of decelerating shiny metal and can be perceived as a streak.

The engine number three was on fire as proven by Powerplant Report in the Public Docket which shows soot and missing blades.

And you know it.

Wiring/cargo door explanation has not been given the consideration it deserves, and one sentence in the Public Docket discussing only eight of the ten latches and nothing about the other 80% of the door is cursory and certainly not thorough.

And you know it.

Wiring/Cargo door is not an idea under a hidden stone; it it out in plain view shouting to be evaluated, and it has been shouting for four years; yet, you refuse to evaluate it thoroughly; you refuse to interview me to allow me to present my twelve years of analysis, facts, data, and evidence for a mechanical explanation that has happened before to a high time Boeing 747.

And you know it.

As long as the Public Docket exists on CDROM, TWA 800 can be wiring/cargo door caused.

As long as the sun shines, TWA 800 can be wiring/cargo door caused.

And you know it.

As public safety officials you are betraying the public trust by refusing to examine all reasonable probable causes for TWA 800. Wiring/cargo door explanation is not conspiracy nonsense, it includes the streak and ignition source, it has happened before, and it is very very reasonable.

And you know it.

Wiring/cargo door explanation is not going to go away with the release of the incomplete TWA 800 AAR. Wiring/cargo door will be evaluated sooner or later by appointees of the current administration or the next one.

As long as the sun shines, wiring/cargo door is a viable and reasonable explanation for TWA 800.

And you know it.

Cheers

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 14, 2002 11:27:04 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Vital information for Boeing safety part II**

Dear Mr. Young, 14 May 02
Enclosed is my AAR involving four Boeing 747s, specifically Pan Am Flight 103, that have the same crash cause which is present today, faulty wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture open in flight. Please have Boeing safety evaluate my AAR and I am available to answer any questions you may have.

Cheers,
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To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Vital information for Boeing safety**

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 22, 2002 11:11:06 PM PDT
To: wwwmail.boeing2@boeing.com
Subject: **Safety hazard report: Wiring on 747s**

Dear Boeing Safety person, 22 June 2002

I am reporting a safety hazard for Boeing 747s. It is urgent as

shown by the recent China Airlines Flight 611 disaster.

I have included my letter to government safety officials below and have attached a pdf file of my SmithAAR for Pan Am Flight 103. By separate email I have sent my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182.

Please contact me for further details.

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To: ksmart@aaib.gov.uk, Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca, kfchou@asc.gov.tw, Lyle.Streeter@faa.dot.gov, WILDEYJ@ntsb.gov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Predictions for China Airlines Flight 611
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

K.F. Chou
Accident Investigation Division
Aviation Safety Council
16th Floor, 99 Fu-Hsing North Road, Taipei 105,
Taiwan, R.O.C.

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Accidents,
Air Accidents Investigations Branch
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Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
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FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Dear Mr. Chou, Mr. Smart, Mr. Tucker, Mr. Wildey, and Mr. Streeter, Friday evening, 21 June 2002

I address you as respected leaders in aviation safety for Taiwan,

United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States of America. I have met Mr. Tucker and Mr. Wildey personally, saw Mr. Streeter at a public hearing, have been in email contact with Mr. Smart, and am emailing Mr. Chou with this very important safety information about a current hazard to the flying public in Boeing 747s when the faulty wiring may short again the forward cargo door unlatch motor causing a sudden inflight breakup within an hour after takeoff in an early model Boeing 747 in which primary radar observed objects departed the aircraft at high speed at initial event time, just as it happened to United Airlines Flight 811 and China Airlines Flight 611.

This is John Barry Smith. I am trivial. My discovery is not. The probable cause of the China Airlines Flight 611 event will be shown to be the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/ explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. The crash cause is not a mystery to me. Permit me the audacity to detail the future results of your investigations into yet another inflight breakup of an early model Boeing 747.

When the forward cargo door ruptures in flight at 300 knots at about 30000 feet in a Boeing 747, as I submit happened to China Airlines Flight 611, certain things have to happen, will happen, and have happened according to physical laws of nature:

1. The CVR will have a sudden loud sound on it which is air molecules rushing out to equalize the pressure differential of 8.9 PSI or about 100,000 pounds on the 99 by 110 inch forward cargo door at about 30,000 feet MSL. They are rushing out because the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door had ruptured open after the door unlatch motor had turned on by shorted crosslinked Tefzel wiring installed on a Boeing 747-209B, delivered on July 16th, 1979, as construction number

21843, line number 386, and called China Airlines Flight 611 on 25 May, 2002.

2. The CVR and FDR will show an abrupt power cut because the tremendous explosion of decompression in the forward cargo bay immediately destroyed the power connections in the adjacent main equipment compartment.

3. The forward cargo door overpressure relief doors will be missing or jammed open as the mechanical linkage also turns when the door latch cams are turned to the open position.

4. There will be peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door from the rupture at that weak area of a non plug cargo door with one latch per eight feet of fuselage slice. This midspan latch has no locking sector to prevent inadvertent opening inflight. There will be torn off skin above the door which was torn off when the entire door opened wide, outward, up, and off.

5. Engine number three will reveal on the breakdown report there are missing blades, sooted blades, soft body impacts, and evidence of uncontainment and foreign object damage when the contents and skin of the forward cargo compartment were ejected into the nearby engine which caused fire and vibration.

6. Engine number three usually detaches early from the subsequent fire and vibration and lands apart from the other three which are grouped together.

7. The starboard side of China Airlines Flight 611 wreckage will show much more damage than the relatively smooth port side. The visible damage will be shattered areas around the forward

cargo door, vertical tears in the fuselage skin above the door, overtravel of the door hinge, possible paint smears on the door and fuselage, and inflight impacts on the right wing leading edge and the right horizontal stabilizer.

8. The shape of the initial large hull rupture will be a thirty foot by forty foot rectangle around the forward cargo door.

9. The first items to leave China Airlines Flight 611 will be from the right side forward of the wing.

United Airlines Flight 811 is the model to compare with China Airlines Flight 611. This shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup has happened four other times with similar facts, data, and evidence, for line numbers 330, 15, 89, 153 and also known as Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800.

Gentlemen of the Aviation Safety Council, AAIB, TSB, NTSB, and FAA, please use my twelve years of research and analysis into Boeing 747 inflight breakups to prevent it happening again, an event I have predicted since 1996 and sadly coming true in front of our eyes. China Airlines Flight 611 probably came apart the same way it was put together with an addition: 1. Nose section forward of the wing. 2. Wing and fuselage above it. 3. Tail section aft of wing. 4. Contents of forward baggage compartment and adjacent structure on right side ejected outward. Three of the sections are in big pieces, the blast section is in smaller pieces.

When the above predictions come to pass, or before, please contact me via phone email or letter for my assistance. I have

much to offer.

Very Respectfully,

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Taiwan
Investigators finish cleaning black boxes from CAL crash, begin analyzing data
2002-06-22 / Associated Press /
Investigators finished cleaning and drying the "black boxes" from a crashed China Airlines jet, and the analysis of the devices might be completed next week, an official said yesterday.

The boxes, also called the voice and flight data recorders, might be key to explaining why the Boeing 747-200 broke apart and plunged into the Taiwan Strait last month, killing 225 passengers and crew. So far, the crash's cause is a mystery.

Investigators have said the Boeing 747-200 split into four pieces about 20 minutes after taking off from Taipei for Hong Kong on May 25.

The pilots never indicated any problems, and the weather was clear, investigators have said. There were also no signs that a

terrorist attack or an errant missile downed the plane.

Search teams have recovered the bodies of 146 people who died in the crash.

"China Airlines said the Boeing 747 was built in 1979 and was the last plane of its kind in the airline's fleet. "

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 22, 2002 11:11:06 PM PDT
To: wwwmail.boeing2@boeing.com
Subject: **Safety hazard report: Wiring on 747s**

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I have included my letter to government safety officials below and have attached a pdf file of my SmithAAR for Pan Am Flight 103. By separate email I have sent my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182.

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Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

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Aviation Safety Council
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Taiwan, R.O.C.

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Accidents,
Air Accidents Investigations Branch
AAIB
DRA Farnborough
Hants GU14 6TD
United Kingdom

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board
Canada

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI

Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

James F. Wildey II
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National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

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To: wwwmail.boeing2@boeing.com
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From: "Boeing Communications"
<boeingreception2006@hotmail.com>
Date: October 10, 2006 10:53:25 AM PDT
Subject: **Boeing Reception RSVP**

Good afternoon!

Hopefully you received the invite that we mailed you to the Annual
Boeing Communications Reception. It's coming up next week and have not
heard if you're going to be able to join us.

Please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible to let me know if you
will be able to attend. You are welcome to bring guests.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17th
6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209
Metro: Rosslyn

Free Parking Available at Boeing Building Enter on Lynn Street

Call Jennifer with any questions: 703-465-3663

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6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/ explosive decompression/inflight breakup**

Dear Mr. Young,

Please examine my data which directly relates to below study. I've attached my AAR for Air India Flight 182 as pdf file. Your engineers will be interested in my research.

Sincerely,

Barry

John Barry Smith
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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

Earlier this year, the air transport industry completed the most comprehensive study ever undertaken into the effects of aging on aircraft systems, with a primary focus on electrical systems.

From that study, recommendations are being developed to further enhance the safety of air transportation. For operators of Boeing airplanes, I'm pleased to report that The Boeing Company has already done a considerable amount of upfront work to enable those recommendations to be readily integrated into airline practices and procedures.

The landmark two-year study was conducted by the Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee, which was established by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in January 1999.

Committee members were drawn from the airframe manufacturer, supplier, airline, and regulatory sides of the aviation industry. The committee focused on jetliners 20 or

more years old, which include about 3,700 Boeing- and Douglas-designed airplanes worldwide. Five key tasks were undertaken: inspection of electrical systems of almost 100 older jetliners of various makes and models, review of electrical systems fleet history in light of service bulletins and airworthiness directives, evaluation of maintenance criteria to identify and correct any aging systems issues, review and updating of standard wiring practices, and review of training programs to ensure that they address aging electrical systems.
The committee uncovered no immediate fleet-safety-related issues, nor did it find any conditions in the wiring or other systems that were not already known by the industry. This is a strong validation of existing processes that call for regulators, manufacturers, and airlines to work together and share information for the benefit of aviation safety.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Ruptures at forward cargo door, wiring/cargo door explanation**

Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2000 05:45:03 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Ruptures at forward cargo door, wiring/cargo door explanation
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Above is from AAR 92/02 page 36, and is forward cargo door of

UAL 811, a 747 whose nose stayed on, showing the rupture at the aft midspan latch. This door is less shattered than TWA 800 because all of the latches on 811 unlatched, including the bottom eight, allowing entire door to open. These bottom eight latches later had the AD to strengthen their locking sectors with steel. The middle ruptures, aft and forward midspan, for TWA 800 were more intense since the bottom eight latches stayed latched, as the NTSB says they were, allowing all the air pressure to attempt to equalize through the two midspan latches. There were no locking sectors to strengthen the midspan latches so whatever the AD was meant to do, it did not apply to the midspan latches.

Dear NTSB, it's not too late. Check out the wiring/cargo door explanation as it should be checked out. The rupture photographs alone for TWA 800 are enough to justify a complete effort worthy of the one for bomb, missile, or center tank. The model AAR is the UAL 811 report, AAR 92/02, available at corazon.com.

Yes, NTSB got it partially wrong with AAR 90/01 the first time with the probable cause being improper latching, but, NTSB being a fine safety organization who puts truth and accuracy ahead of pride, admitted the partial error and consequently wrote another AAR, 92/02, giving wiring/switch as the probable cause of the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Try the wiring/cargo door hypothesis and ask questions based upon that premise. I can answer them. The wiring/cargo door explanation clears up mysteries for TWA 800, some asked and some not.

Why the red paint smears on white paint mainly above the forward cargo door?

What is ignition source for the center tank explosion?
Why were bodies not burned around center tank?
Why were some pieces of metal around the center tank not sooted?
Why was engine number three sooty inside and have missing blades?
How did the piece of engine blade get into the right horizontal stabilizer?
Why were the first pieces to leave TWA 800 just forward of the wing?
Why does sudden loud sound on CVR match that of UAL 811 sudden loud sound?
Why does abrupt power cut to FDR match that of UAL 811 abrupt power cut?
What caused streak?
Why was bomb suspected for so long?
Why did nose come off?
Why was bare wire found in cargo door area?

All above answered by wiring/cargo door explanation.

Above shows TWA 800 rupture at forward midspan latch of forward cargo door, outward petal shaped bulge, paint smears as door below slams upward, missing latches, shattered condition of door and missing manual locking handle and torque tubes, bellcranks, and viewing ports and overpressure relief doors, all missing from reconstruction, database, or discussion in exhibits.

Ah, but the facts are there for wiring/cargo door, but so what? What are the emotional, political, economic impacts of wiring/cargo door, the big picture, if you will.

I do not want to enter the black hole of conspiracy. I will not believe that Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede, Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter believe in wiring/ cargo door explanation but are keeping it a secret or trying to project an explanation, such as center tank explosion, they know is wrong. I do believe that safety officials are trying to let a sleeping dog lie where it is, and that is wiring/cargo door explanation.

I do not believe that safety officials believe that a Poly X wiring insulated wire shorted on a door unlatch motor for TWA 800 which turned ten latches to the open position, and thankfully, the bottom eight had locking sectors of steel from an AD but unthankfully, the two midspan latches of the forward cargo door did not have locking sectors and ruptured in flight suddenly allowing the entire starboard side of fuselage forward of the wing to shatter, and nose comes off, and engines catch fire and blow up disintegrating fuel tanks, and pieces of metal fly off to reflect as a streak in the orange sunset sky and sudden loud sound on CVR...and on and on. And believe it but are trying not to allow the information to be analyzed properly. There is no cover up of previous errors of judgment.

I think everyone in official world thinks it was spontaneous center tank explosion from unknown mysterious ignition source and that no way, absolutely no way, did that forward cargo door open in flight. The photo of shattered skin shows what happened after that all latched and all intact door hit the ocean. It's coincidence that the CVR and FDR match a previous cargo door event. The outward opening petal shaped rupture at the forward midspan latch of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 was caused

by water entering the intact door area when it hit and the water gushed out at the midspan latches causing the outward ruptures.

Well, when I look at it that way, it is not a stretch to ignore, reject the wiring/cargo door explanation when based on false logic, hasty opinion, and denial of in your face evidence.

Wiring/cargo door explanation does require a ruptured forward cargo door in flight And the actual photo of the actual door area of the actual Boeing 747 called TWA 800 shows a ruptured cargo door.

So, how can the facts be so clear and yet so rejected?

Wishful thinking? Not conspiracy, please please please.

Is that wishful thinking that the answer to the mystery of cause of TWA 800 crash belongs to NTSB and not FBI, and certainly not citizen working on his own? Well, that would be pride. And pride comes before a fall, or so they say.

To protect Boeing as the manufacturer will extinct Boeing the way it's going. No airline is going to buy an airplane from a company and then charged with murder if the plane crashes, or bankrupted when sued, or reputation destroyed. The basic design flaw is outward opening nonplug doors, any kind of door. All this latch and lock sector stuff is an attempt to correct that design flaw. As long as latches and cams and bellcranks and locking sectors are used to close a nonplug door, sooner or later, the nonplug door pops open, somehow, someway.

Boeing should know that planes crash and the way around that is to find out what's wrong and fix it. (Note Boeing does not agree

with the center tank as initial event explanation. I am not alone.)

Protect the reputation of NTSB? This wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 would enhance NTSB's reputation. They did UAL 811 which allowed civilian citizens, the Campbells, to put it all together. To now check out the wiring/cargo door explanation would mean that NTSB checked every possible explanation and at the last minute, went back and rechecked the initial explanation for TWA 800, forward cargo door opening in flight. And Bingo, it all made sense with the new added information such as engine breakdown report, wreckage database, and CVR, FDR data readouts.

Elections coming up? Does that affect TWA 800? Well, if there is a change of administrations, then when I go back with this same data to new appointees, the response may be different and wiring/cargo door does get looked into.

Emotional impacts? Deep well earned satisfaction of following a problem right to the end. And as far as the Poly X wiring culprit, NTSB has already investigated in depth the innocent evils of that particular insulation. The wiring company did not intentionally make wiring that easily chafed, become worn after vibration and wore down to bare metal and exposure to water.

Well, actually, kind officials, I'm out of my area when it comes to emotional impacts and money, sort of like sporting events, elections, and the stock market, do opposite what I say.

But I do know airplanes and in particular, cargo doors on Boeing 747s. The below officials' responses about that door are inadequate to rule it out as a cause for TWA 800. The responses are low on facts and high on opinion. The few facts given are

wrong and if the opinions are based on those errors, then the opinion is wrong too. Saying the door was all latched and all intact at water impact does not make it so, especially when contradicted by actual photographs of the actual wreckage of the actual airplane.

References to forward cargo door sill from FAA:
29 Oct 97 letter from Mr. Wojnar/Pederson/Breneman to JBS:
"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water." "However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

"However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side."

False, wreckage of most of the door is missing and damage is inward and outward on the right side.

18 Nov 96 letter from Mr. McSweeny/Kirkpatrick, FAA, to Congressman Farr:
"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

False and the above photo is evidence enough.

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS:
"While no scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center wing tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

Outward explosion yes but recanted later for unknown reasons.

"You may not agree with the reasoning of the official accident investigators, but I want you to understand the evidence to date indicates that the CWT explosion preceded any fuselage breakup, including damage to the forward cargo door."

Opinion.

19 Feb 1998 letter from Mr. Neil Schalekamp to JBS:
"The theory of an explosive decompression, due to a sudden opening of the forward cargo door was one theory that was examined. However, it has been determined that this did not

occur. Based upon the existing evidence, the National Transportation Safety Board, (NTSB), the agency in charge of the accident investigation, believes that the probable cause of the accident was a center wing fuel tank (CWT) explosion, due to an internal fuel tank ignition source. The FAA agrees with the NTSB on this matter.

What? agrees with internal fuel tank ignition source whose identity has eluded the best minds in the business for four years?

You apparently believe that the forward cargo door precipitated the accident scenario by initially separating from the airplane. The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the plane impacted the ocean."

Absolutely incorrect, the door was not attached and not latched at all latches and the photo above is evidence enough.

References about forward cargo door from NTSB:
24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:
"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Absolutely incorrect, 95% was not recovered, not even 60% of both doors was recovered. Missing items of aft door: midspan latches, manual locking handle, torque tubes, viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, approximately twenty percent of door skin.

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:
"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Early on, before wreckage database and CVR and FDR analysis, a hasty decision was made based upon the examination of one door sill, that the forward cargo door was latched and locked and all intact at water impact. That early decision is absolutely incorrect.

19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to JBS:
"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

Opinion.

12 January 1998 letter from Jim Wildey, NTSB, to JBS:

"The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility."

Opinion.

10 March 1998 letter from John B. Drake, NTSB, to JBS:
"As we have stated in numerous previous responses, the investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility."

Opinion.

4 Mar 98 letter to me from Senator John McCain stating, "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:
"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door.

We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Prompt denial, yes.

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:
10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :
"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

And there you have it, gentlemen of the public safety Board, keyword Safety. "Expect no further response" from the Safety Board. What were the responses in the first place? Door was all latched and all intact at water impact? That's your story and you're sticking to it? No additional evidence or analysis which comes along to contradict the center tank explanation and supports wiring/cargo door explanation will be considered? Closed minds? I think so.

There you have it, no meeting with NTSB with me, no further responses from NTSB to me, and no questions to anybody. I should be flattered. But I don't take it personally, it's not me that NTSB is afraid of, terrified of, that they will not face me, it's the idea. It's the idea of something that was not supposed to happen again, happened again. My idea of wiring/cargo door is the bogeyman NTSB is running from, not me. I am trivial as a messenger; the idea is the killer. Explosive decompression that mimics a bomb when it goes off and yet isn't a bomb, is the idea.

ADs that don't fix the problem they are supposed to fix is the idea. Conclusions that are made in haste based on insufficient and not corrected later is the idea that is attempting to see light but is rejected.

And so, wiring/cargo door explanation just sits there in your minds as a possible explanation for TWA 800. And you know it. You all know it because you all can look at pictures as above and realize, that door may have exploded open in flight. It makes a lie of the entire mission of NTSB, to independently and exhaustively consider all plausible explanations for an aircraft accident. That has not been done for wiring/cargo door for TWA 800 and you know it. You know how to do it right by looking at AAR 92/02 and reading about cams and torque tubes and manual locking handles, all of which are missing for both doors, not just the forward. You have made errors of judgment before on that pesky door with AAR 90/01 but did the noble thing and corrected the error with a new AAR. At that time, there was no one saying it was not improper latching except for a couple whose son had died, the Campbells. And sure enough, they were right, just as I am right, wiring shorted on the forward unlatch motor and ruptures occurred at both midspan latches, as seen in photographs of wreckage reconstruction.

Well, these mechanically caused accidents have a way of reoccurring, it's inevitable because machines are consistent, they do the same things under the same conditions. The conditions are high time early model Boeing 747s using Poly X wiring and sooner or later, bare wire is exposed and shorted against metal fuselage, probably in the presence of condensation water, and things happen that aren't supposed to happen, such as a motor turning on. And the destruction sequence starts again.

My conscience is clear. I have done all that can be expected of a citizen with a lifetime of experience in aviation and has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash presenting over a decade of research and analysis using official reports to offer the wiring/cargo door explanation for sudden fiery night fatal jet plane crashes to transportation safety board and federal aviation safety officials for investigation and action.

I really feel as if the death warrants for hundreds of passengers will be signed as soon as I give up trying to persuade officials to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation. So I can't give up. I will continue to mail photos, text, analysis, and evidence interpretation to NTSB and FAA. Sooner or later, I believe, I will come across an official who understands drag, lift, and thrust, explosive decompression, and electricity and has some sort of innate sense of responsibility to the ignorant public at large to check out all plausible possibilities, not just prosecute the favored one. That person is is the one with the open mind and I will be able to immediately identify that person and will give him/her all the answers then need to the questions they ask.

So far, I have not me that safety official, but I will not give up, after all, it is a life and death matter, I should know, I have been there, I have been to the life and death location, I was the life and my pilot was the death. I have come back and am telling you that wiring/cargo door problem is destroying high time Boeing 747s and it's not a bomb, or a missile, or a spontaneous center tank explosion caused by mystery ignition source; it's wiring shorting on door unlatch motor which causes ruptures at midspan latches leading to catastrophic explosive decompression. And if you want to see what that looks like, just look at the photo above. The explosion shatters the local door area into many pieces, most of which never get recovered.

Well, these letters should make good reading for future safety officials to know what not to do: Ignore a motivated citizen with access to the internet for research, time to do it, money to pay for travel and copies of documents, tons of experience in evaluation of plane crashes, and with an explanation that is plausible, makes sense, not loaded with conspiracy nonsense, and supported by text, evidence, and photographs.

No further response? Is that the attitude of a questioning safety body with an open investigation on their hands with a favored probable cause that has a huge problem? No further response? When the previous responses were limited and based on hasty conclusions? Apparently so, and that is sad. It doesn't have to be that way. Every stone can be turned over and the underside examined. It's not too late although I have to say, it's getting closer to too late every day. I imagine the trial of TWA 800 will be the next forum to expound the wiring/cargo door explanation, there must be someone on trial for their freedom and money that will hear me out about the wiring/cargo door explanation, especially if they are blamed for starting a fire they didn't set.

Cheers,
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US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Latches and sill missing from cargo doors of TWA 800**

Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2000 11:26:58 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Latches and sill missing from cargo doors of TWA 800
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000

Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter

To properly rule out a suspect, (forward cargo door opening in flight), that suspect must have an airtight alibi and the story checks out, especially if the suspect is the prime suspect. Well, for the forward cargo door, prime suspect, former killer, the story does not check out; the alibi is full of holes, literally, and the

evidence in hand points right to it.

Look at the photo of the door and its adjacent area particularly to the left of "RF25":

Prima Facie evidence shows the door to be shattered. Water impact would push it inward, as is shown on some shattered pieces. That was water impact. However, there are outward ruptures at the midspan latches Photo above shows forward midspan latch area ruptured outward. Aft midspan latch shattered area and outward bulge petal shape rupture shown below in NTSB photo

For all 747s there are twenty latches, two sills, and sixteen locking sectors on two identical main cargo doors. For TWA 800 not all have been recovered to be examined and deemed normal and therefore able to rule out open cargo door in flight.

For the forward door of TWA 800, according to NTSB written documents of Exhibit 15C and wreckage database, original and updated, only eight of the ten latches, one sill, and eight locking sectors have been recovered and examined. That's not enough for a thorough examination of a former prime suspect.

UAL 811 shows a proper examination of a forward cargo door mechanical aspects:

Note excerpt for UAL 811, a confirmed open cargo door event.

The forward mid-span latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft mid-span latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during latching.

For UAL 811, a proper examination of the mechanical aspects of the suspected forward cago door:

NTSB/AAR-92/02
(SUPERSEDES NTSB/AAR-90/01)

1.16.1 Cargo Door Hardware Examinations
1.16.1.1 Before Recovery of the Door
The following forward cargo door closing and latching components were returned to the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory for analysis after they were documented in place on the airplane:
Two pull-in hook pins, one from the lower end of the forward side of the door body cutout forward frame, and one from the lower end of the aft side of the body cutout aft frame, with housings;
Two mid-span pins, one from the forward side of the door body cutout forward frame, and one from the aft side of the door body cutout aft frame.
All components were initially examined while installed on the airplane. All eight forward cargo door latch pins, with housings, were removed for further laboratory examination. Also, for comparison, one of the latch pins, with housing, from the aft cargo door was also removed. For orientation purposes, the eight lower latch pin assemblies are referred to by number, with the

No. 1 latch pin being the most forward on the lower door sill, and the No. 8 pin being the most aft. When referencing a circumferential location on the latch pins or mid-span pins, a clock position was used. The clock code was oriented looking forward with 12 o'clock being straight up and 9 o'clock being directly inboard.

Based on the orientation of the latching mechanisms, the fully unlatched latching cams would first contact the latch pins from about the 1:15 o'clock position to the 7:15 position as the door was closed. As the cams are being latched around the pins, they would rotate approximately 80(, making contact with the pins from about the 4:15 position to the 10:15 position (See figure 7).

Detailed examination of the exposed surface of the pins (the portion of the pins extending from the housings) revealed various types of wear and damage. In general, all of the forward door cargo latch pins had smooth wear over the entire portion of the pin area contacted by the cams during normal closing and opening of the door. The pins also had distinct roughened (smeared) areas between the 6:15 and the 7:30 positions (See figure 8). The roughened areas had evidence of "heat tinting" and transfer of cam material to the surface of the pins. On pins 1 and 8 the roughened areas extended past the pin bottom to the 5:00 position. The 7:30 position approximately corresponds to the area on the pin where the lower surface of the cam would be relative to the pin when the latch cams are in the unlatched or nearly unlatched position.

The forward pull-in hook pin was not significantly bent, but the structure to which it was attached was deformed outward, so the hook pin was deflected significantly outward. Three of the four bolts holding the aft pull-in hook pin had sheared, so the hook pin was also deflected outward. Both hook pin ends were damaged, but neither pin was significantly deformed along its length. There was significant heat tinting on the damaged area of

the forward hook pin. Boeing engineering calculations determined that the pull-in hook pins would fail at a 3.5 psi differential cabin pressure with the latch cams unlatched.
The forward mid-span latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft mid-span latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during latching.

1.16.1.2 After Recovery of the Door

The documentation of the recovered cargo door was divided into four areas: 1) door structure, 2) master latch lock system, 3) latch system, and 4) hook system. A description of the recovered door follows.

1. Door Structure:

The cargo door had fractured longitudinally near the mid-span lap joint near stringer 34R, just beneath the mid-span torque tubes. Except for an area of missing skin between frames 2 and 3 and a portion of frame webs where the upper latch lock torque tube had torn out, the frames and skin of the upper door piece mated to the lower door piece.2 Several areas of the upper door skin along the longitudinal fracture were bent back. In addition, a large area of lower door skin between frame 6 and the aft door edge had peeled downward from the fracture line. The two door pieces are shown together in Figures 9 and 10. Examinations of the fracture surfaces of the skin and frames revealed no evidence of pre-existing cracks. All fractures were typical of overstress separation.

Seven of the eight lock sector slots in the lower beam showed evidence of contact and scraping by the lock sectors. Only the No. 1 lock sector slot was undamaged, although the bracket forward and above the No. 1 slot did appear to have been damaged by contact from the lock sector (slots numbered 1-8, forward-aft). The direction of the scraping on the slots could not be determined conclusively.

The decal covering the latch actuator manual drive port was found broken circumferentially around the edge of the port cover, which was loose and rotated from its normal position (See figure 11). There was an impression in the decal similar to a Phillips-head screw slot in line with the center of the retainer screw securing the cover. There was also a 0.06-inch-long linear slit from 10 to 4 o'clock approximately centered over the retainer screw head (See figures 12 and 13). There was no rotational tearing and no loss of decal material in the area covering the screw head location. During examinations of the door at Boeing, it was noted that the retainer bracket on the inside of the latch actuator manual drive port cover was bowed outward; the port cover was not deformed. The retainer bracket on the inside of the hook actuator manual drive port cover was similarly bowed outward, and the port cover was bowed outward.

The hinge that attaches the cargo door to the fuselage is comprised of several hinge sections--those attached along the upper edge of the cargo door and those along the fuselage just above the cargo door cutout--interconnected with hinge pins. The hinge pins and all hinge sections from N4713U's forward cargo door were intact; all hinge sections rotated relatively easily. All attach bolts from the hinge sections on the door remained attached; conversely, no bolts remained attached to the hinge sections on the fuselage. Several areas on the hinge sections, such as the fuselage hinge sections, showed evidence of contact from the door during overtravel (See figure 14). In addition, the fuselage forward hinge sections

were slightly bent. The upper flange of the door, to which the door hinges are attached, was not deformed. The forward cargo door can rotate open 143 degrees before the hinge would deform, permitting the door to contact the fuselage above.

Examination of the outer skin contour of the upper door piece revealed that it had been crushed inward. There were also many

areas on the outer skin where blue and red paint transfer marks could be seen. These marks were generally forward of the aft pressure-relief door, and the blue marks were located above the red marks. The UAL paint pattern incorporates red and blue stripes along the fuselage above the cargo door. Figure 15 is a plot of the documented paint marks on the upper door piece. There was no evidence of the pressure relief door shrouds found on the forward door; however, most of the inner door lining to which the shrouds attach was missing.

2. Master Latch Lock System:

All eight lock sectors were found in the locked position--actually past the fully locked position. They had been pulled through the lock sector slots in the lower beam of the cargo door. (When they are fully locked, the lock sectors should be recessed in the lower beam approximately 3/8 inch). All lock sectors had deflected off the high shoulder of the latch cams due to interference with the partially unlatched cams. Prior to disassembly of the components, the interference between the cams and the lock sectors was removed by rotating the cams to the latched position. Examination of the lock sectors disclosed that the bottom of the lower arm of each lock sector was gouged. For seven of the eight lock sectors, the distance from the main gouge area to the location of the interference between the latch cam and the lock sector was approximately 0.75 inch. (The No. 2 lock sector was corroded and had fractured at the location of the large gouge common to the other seven lock sectors. Consequently, it was not in contact with the No. 2 latch cam when the door was retrieved). The master latch lock handle housing and trigger were found relatively flush with the door outer skin. The top of the handle was recessed approximately 0.50 inch inward from flush, and the bottom of the handle was protruding approximately 0.40 inch outward from flush (See figure 16). This

Figure 15.--Documented paint marks on outer skin of upper door

piece. Dashed line is approximately 8 degrees from horizontal. position of the handle indicates that the lock sectors were in a position past fully locked. The fuse pin was found in three pieces but was heavily corroded. The handle housing was undamaged. Two of the three connecting rods between the master latch lock handle and the lock sector torque tube were bowed slightly, but they were otherwise intact. No deformation was observed on any section of the lock sector torque tube, although one of the six bearings assembled on the torque tube had been damaged. The No. 3 bearing inner race and its torque tube locator sleeve were displaced forward approximately 0.20 inch from the bearing housing centerline. The outer race was broken and pushed forward out of the housing.

The lower two connecting rods between the lock sector torque tube and the torque tube below the pressure-relief doors were undamaged; however, the upper connecting rod had separated at the upper, tapered end. The torque tube below the pressure-relief doors were missing, and the pressure-relief door connecting rods had separated at the lower, tapered end. The remaining portion of each rod was undamaged, but the forward pressure-relief door was jammed open into the cutout.

3. Latch System:

All eight lower latch cams were found in a nearly unlatched position, and all of them were binding against the lock sectors except the No. 2 cam (lock sector No. 2 had broken). Latch cams 1-6 were approximately 62 degrees from the fully latched position, and cams 7 and 8 were approximately 70 degrees from fully latched. Full rotation of the latch cams is 80 degrees. Several of the lower latch cams contained compression and smearing damage on the lower lip of the latch cam cavity ("lower" relative to an open cam). This damage is consistent with the forceful movement of the cams across the latch pins.

The four rods between the latch actuator torque tube and the four

bellcranks containing the latch cams were attached and undamaged. No section of the latch actuator torque tube was damaged, and the bearings/supports along the tube were intact. The latch actuator was removed and later disassembled. No anomalies were found.

4. Pull-in Hook System:

The forward and aft pull-in hooks were found near the closed position. Both of them exhibited wear patterns consistent with contact with the pull-in hook pins during door operation. For both the forward and aft hooks, the inboard edge of the pull-in hook channel contained compression and smearing damage consistent with a forceful movement of the hooks over the pins while the hooks were in the closed or nearly closed position.

Gentlemen,

TWA 800 investigation was extensive but not complete. The wiring/cargo door explanation needs examination. All ten latches were not recovered, all then were not examined, all ten were not given the type of examination that was given to UAL 811, a high time 747 that had a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR when its cargo door opened in flight and which forensic evidence matches TWA 800.

Why do you not contact me? Why do you not interview me and ask me to rubut any questions or contradiction or impossibilities in the wiring/cargo door explanation?

Door all latched and intact at water impact is wrong, it is not the opinion of an aircraft accident investigator who understands explosive decompression and knows the history of it dating back to the mid '50s and the Comet.

The evidence, the real and historical evidence that can be seen with your own eyes and listened to with your own ears says the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight and why it opened is a good question. I vote for the UAL 811 NTSB second explanation of electrical and not improperly latched, or bomb, or missile, or center tank explosion or other.

To reject the wiring/cargo door explanation based upon a falsehood is a serious error. The falsehood is the forward cargo door was all latched, locked, intact at water impact. That is based upon the false data of all ten latches of the forward door recovered and examined and found to be locked and normal; and that the shattered areas of the door were caused by water impact when the ruptures at the midspan latches were outward.

The eight bottom cams have locking sectors to prevent the latches from unlocking once the unlatch motor gets shorted on by fault. That AD was done after UAL 811, but the killer here is that the two midspan latches never had and still don't have locking sectors. So when all ten try to unlatch, as they are told to do by the unlatch motor, the bottom eight hold true, while the two midspan just have to unlatch enough to go over dead center and the 38115 and more pounds of internal pressure push out the rest of the door.

Yes, the two midspan latches are the only ones without locking sectors, a design flaw that is only equalled by have the huge doors non-plug.

To reject an explanation with precedent, which explains the streak, and identifies the mystery ignition source, which based upon wishful thinking of having all the latches, cams, torque tubes, manual locking handle, and latch pins upon which to base

a rejection, is terribly terribly wrong when you don't have the manual locking handle, all ten latches, cams, or latch pins.

You don't have the evidence which would lead you to dismiss/ reject/rebut the wiring/cargo door explanation.

However, the wiring/cargo door explanation has massive historical and forensic evidence to support such a claim, starting with photographs above which show a very shattered starboard side forward of the wing cargo door area and, for comparison, a very smooth port side.

Starboard side above showing shattered cargo door area just forward of wing.

Below is what all that NTSB has to say about the forward cargo door and its ten latches:

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

Wreckage database does not have full complement of sills, latches, or cams.

Regarding the recent response of Shelly Hazle of NTSB with the below excerpt:

"For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

Note that nowhere is there the claim that the two midspan latches have been recovered, only ignored or ruled unimportant. Ruled unimportant by Ms. Hazle, not an aircraft accident investigator.

The forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened/shattered/ruptured in flight and it started at the midspan latches, just like UAL 811.

That claim must be investigated as thoroughly as any other plausible explanation for TWA 800. Wiring/cargo door has not been given that same standard of investigation. The investigation is incomplete and unworthy of NTSB to make final as it stands.

The grounds for rejection of wiring/cargo door explanation are faulty and contradicted by NTSB evidence of Exhibit and database.

So, what to do? Hide, run for cover, ignore it, pretend it doesn't exist, attack the messenger, circle the wagons? Or do the right thing, the thing you were trained to do, swore to do, paid to do, want to do, find out why planes crash so they won't crash again, and to do that you need to find out why TWA 800 crashed and to do that you must do the aircraft investigator thing, check out all

the plausible explanations and rule them in or rule them out.

To rule out wiring/cargo door, you know more needs to be done than a few sentences after examination of less than fifty percent of the many pieces of the forward cargo door.

To rule out the open door inflight you need more than a condescending sentence about it by Chairman Hall at the Dec 97 Baltimore hearings, or a few sentences by Dr. Loeb at the 23 Aug 00, hearing, or a short exhibit by Mr. Wildey about the bottom sill.

UAL 811 is the model again for proper AAR for examination of a forward cargo door suspected of coming open in flight.

The first step is to talk to me and confront me with all the data and evidence you believe rules out open cargo door in flight, and eight of ten latches in hand is not good enough. Especially since the two midspan latches of UAL 811 were never recovered either.

What is the personal angle to this? Why did Mr. Goelz say I was 'peddling' wiring/cargo door explanation for profit? Why is wiring/cargo door explanation given NTSB worth equal to 'plane too heavy to fly that day'? Why am I referred to as 'A member of the public."

Why the constant denigration of the messenger and never professional queries about the message?

Where are the technical questions of accidents using acronyms of PSI, FS, IAS, MSL, NM? I know the questions that open minds ask because I have been answering them from my web site to the

hundreds of pilots and other who email me discussing the wiring/ cargo door explanation. I know that dozens of FAA and NTSB and Boeing computers have been logging on to corazon.com thousands of times over the past four years because I have the IP resolved of visiting computers below from previous month statistics:

760:	0.78%:	blv-proxy-01.boeing.com
329:	0.31%:	blv-proxy-02.boeing.com
467:	0.60%:	blv-proxy-03.boeing.com
483:	0.41%:	blv-proxy-04.boeing.com
253:	0.31%:	blv-proxy-05.boeing.com
12:	0.01%:	blv-proxy-06.boeing.com
74:	0.14%:	svifw02.lgb.cal.boeing.com
2:	:	proxy-le0.cal.boeing.com
41:	0.04%:	stl-proxy-01.stl.mo.boeing.com
37:	0.04%:	svwww007.stl.mo.boeing.com
25:	0.02%:	svwww008.stl.mo.boeing.com
65:	0.05%:	slb-proxy-01.boeing.com
108:	0.09%:	www-fw-proxy1.boeing.com
123:	0.09%:	www-fw-proxy2.boeing.com
77:	0.05%:	www-fw-proxy3.boeing.com
373:	0.33%:	www-fw-proxy4.boeing.com
121:	0.11%:	www-fw-proxy5.boeing.com
11:	0.01%:	firewall.ntsb.gov
3:	:	awaproxy.faa.gov
216:	0.30%:	enduser.faa.gov

I know the closed mind questions and they are usually the conspiracy guys with all capitals, obscenities, misspellings, multiple exclamation marks, anonymous, and question/statement full of error, misstatements, and accusations.

I'm not getting the open minded questions from NTSB but am

getting some of the closed mind responses.

I will say this to Chairman Hall, who asked plaintively at the Dec 99 hearing words to the effect, "Why were the passengers above and near the center fuel tank not burned?"

I answer you now, Chairman Hall, as I did then in an email, "They were not burned because they were not there to be burned when the center tank exploded. They had previously been ejected into the air after the nose came off from the huge hole on the starboard side where the cargo door used to be. None of the parts recovered in that nose has sooting. Only later, when the noseless fuselage is falling and the wings and fuel tank are coming apart, and the on fire number three engines is spinning and falling too, do the two meet, ignite, and explode.

The big and little mysteries that are left hanging with the wiring/center tank explanation are explained with the wiring/cargo door explanation. Streak, ignition source, lack of burns, engine blade in right horizontal stabilizer, sooting on blades of engine number three.

By the way, the statement about all four engines operating normally until water impact is just as false as forward cargo door all latched and intact until water impact.

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

8. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all' of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal

stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight.

Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball.

More NTSB produced evidence of wiring/cargo door explanation being worthy of further investigation:
7. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

4. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

It's not too late to one more final investigation of a new scenario/ sequence that has emerged when given a new interpretation of current information, as the NTSB author of Exhibit 18A states.

Gentlemen, please do what you said you would do, are supposed to do, and want to do, check out all the plausible explanations for TWA 800, including wiring/cargo door explanation.

Cheers,

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US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Post TWA 800 hearing analysis**

Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2000 01:54:59 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Post TWA 800 hearing analysis
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
For NTSB: Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000

Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter
You have done an extensive investigative job on TWA 800; extensive and expensive but not complete. You have prosecuted the center tank explosion as the initial event. You have defended your probable cause from missile or meteor or electromagnetic or bomb. But you have not defended it properly from wiring/cargo door explanation. You essentially offer the wiring/center tank explanation for TWA 800 which is refuted by photographic evidence of dark soot and suddenly non-soot whiteness on upper fuselage and smooth port and shattered starboard side just forward of the wing of TWA 800 reconstruction. A center tank explosion would do centered spherical sooting and shattering. The evidence shows unilateral starboard damage and a sudden break of the fuselage with no fire on one side. You have no ignition source after trying God with static electricity, pump manufacturer, and now mechanics drilling and not removing shavings.

Wiring/center tank explosion is not the initial event.

Wiring/cargo door is. The photographic evidence shows the shattered door and the outward ruptures at midspan latches. The ignition source for later center tank fire/explosion is the on fire engine number three, fodded because it is closest to the forward cargo door and would ingest foreign objects and catch fire should that door open or rupture in flight, as happened in UAL 811.

Well, the sound of the CVR and the visual of the wreckage all support wiring/cargo door, and yet, no investigation other than checking eight of ten latches of which there are twenty on that Boeing 747 in two identical cargo doors.

All latched and locked and door intact at water impact? Whose opinion is that? Certainly not an aircraft accident investigator. That sounds like a metallurgist's opinion. Is it? Well, it's wrong. The door was shattered up high and the bottom eight latches of ten available may have been latched and locked at water impact but the midspan latches were long gone.
So, why was not the wiring/cargo door explanation given as much official attention and investigation as the wacky bomb, missile, EMG, and meteor explanations? Wiring/cargo door has happened before in similar type aircraft under similar conditions leaving similar forensic evidence on metal, tape, and paint and should have had priority.

So, after Senator John McCain personally asked Chairman Hall to discuss with me the wiring/cargo door explanation, and Chairman Hall declined, I have come to the conclusion that you are all ducking me, refusing to think, refusing to talk, refusing to listen, refusing to consider wiring/cargo door explanation. Is it because it leads to PA 103 and AI 182? Is it because it was NIH, not invented here, syndrome? Is it because you hate to admit you were wrong, even about small things? Is it fear? Fear that the wiring/cargo door explanation is correct and the implications are perceived as dire? Dire to who?

It's dire to passengers and crew if you're wrong, NTSB, and wiring pops a door...again, and again. It's dire to the manufacturer if it is shown that aging wiring is a problem in airliners. Wait, that's been done already by NTSB. There is nothing to fear anymore. The main problem has been identified: Aging wiring in aging aircraft.

On many main items we agree on TWA 800:

You say mechanical; I say so too
You say aging wiring is problem; I say so too.
Initial event is wiring short, I say so too.
You say catastrophic; I say so too.
You say no bomb or missile or meteor or electromagnetic interference; I say so too.

Only in details do we disagree:

Your suspect wiring is just aft of the wing leading edge and mine is just forward.
Initial event after wiring short is cargo door rupture and not spontaneous center tank explosion.
Center tank exploded later, ignited by on fire engine number three.
Nose came off after huge hole on starboard side appeared just forward of wing, (see NTSB photograph for shattered area.)
Streak is piece or pieces of door area of shiny metal reflecting evening orange sunlight to observers on ground as they spin away after explosive decompression.
Place of explosive decompression is the two midspan latches of forward cargo door, (see photos of midspan latches showing outward open petal rupture.)
http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html
http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html

Photo above shows a door that was not intact and latched at water impact but shattered and ruptured at midspan latches early on.

We are close in probable cause, but far enough away so that the

suspect forward wiring is still there and not yet inspected and replaced if necessary when cracked, chafed, or worn to bare wire, as Poly X is wont to do.

Curious that, wiring was inspected in cargo doors of MD 11, fuel tanks of 747s, but not cargo doors of 747s, although cargo doors have opened in both designs but only the Boeing 747 has confirmed wiring/switch problems.

But, what now? Well, wait for another one to fall down I assume. 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1996 are the years of open cargo door in flight events for high time Boeing 747s that I am tracking. It's now 2000.

We will all know at the same time the cause of the next wiring/ cargo door event because it will follow such a predictable pattern:
Sudden loud sound on the CVR not matched to bomb but matched to explosive decompression. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Sudden power cut off to FDR and secondary transponder. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) More inflight damage on the right side of aircraft. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Forward cargo door found in pieces, aft door intact and latched. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Front section will be torn off from aft section. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Engine 3 fodded. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Damage start location in or near forward cargo hold. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) At least nine never recovered bodies of passengers and crew. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Wreckage plot areas will be front section, aft section, and engines with number three engine apart from other

three. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Possible streak of departing door if sun angle and observers is aligned. (Just like TWA 800.) Aircraft will be a high time Boeing 747. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.)
So, Gentlemen entrusted with the public safety in aviation, you have not properly ruled out open cargo door inflight for TWA 800 because you have refused to discuss the explanation with the leading advocate and discoverer of it, that's me, as well as not having the required evidence such as a smooth cargo door and all ten latches to substantiate your reason for ruling it out as:
Dr. Loeb of NTSB: "We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact."

That statement above is absolutely false, full of errors, and a wrong conclusion. All claims are refuted by official documents and photographs which were emailed to you yesterday.
Until you talk to me, you have not done your job of a complete aircraft accident investigation for TWA 800. And you know it after these long four years and hundreds of emails from me filled with facts such as analysis attached. I've included the analysis below to refute any accusation of weirdness, lack of research, faulty reasoning, and inaccuracy of facts presented by me. I'm not a missile guy or a bomb guy nor any conspiracy person. I'm the reasonable aviator who has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet crash and is saying that for several Boeing 747s, an event that

happened before has happened again for TWA 800 and supports that plausible claim with extensive facts, data, and evidence.

Until you face, consider, and thoroughly investigate the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800, you have failed. You have failed your duty as public safety officials to whom media, manufacturers, and citizens look toward for a complete investigation. You did not do a complete investigation. You did a specialized prosecution of center tank explosion. The wiring/cargo door explanation is still there, waiting for examination. And you know it. One exhibitin the Public docket and a sentence at a public hearing is not a complete investigation of a cause initially thought to the answer, forward cargo door opened in flight and ruled out within days based upon cursory examination of some but not all of the latches and some but not all of the cargo door.

I again challenge you, as NTSB officials, as public safety officials, to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 by interacting with the proponent, the one who knows the most about it. If your mind is changed in some areas, then the better for it; if not changed, then you may rest that you have done a complete job of investigation and the better for it also.

Sincerely,

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135

certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996."

Analysis by JBS>
1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine teardown facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton.
2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. A forensic powerplant teardown is likely to require several man hundred hours per engine with several thousand hours of metallographic back up work. Additionally many specialized tools are required to do this. There should be many thousands of feet of tape or pictures. Haste is evident in a one day teardown per engine in an empty hangar with only one engine specialist present.

Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted

of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine (HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Analysis by JBS>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in this same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in this report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing and irregular FDR EPR readings.

Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples which are mainly irrelevant in a discussion about engines and teardown results. 33% of engine report is not about engines but about favored NTSB explanation of center tank fuel explosion as initial event.

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades

with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

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Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

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Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame.

The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>

The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at<http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html> Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears.

The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then

decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals.

It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.

Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces.
Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report.
"RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting

RF3A-H These pieces are part of the
forward main cargo door.
Some have grimy corrosion
inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.
These pieces are part of the
forward main cargo door.
Some have grimy corrosion
inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.
RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting
RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting
RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting
RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting
RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting
RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting
RF8A No sooting No sooting
RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting
RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting
RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting
RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting
RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting
RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting
RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting
RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting"

NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft

popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that

new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound

11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in

data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and

perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800
John Barry Smith
11 Jan 98
Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff from hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. The slack in

bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch.
The nine foot by nine foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. Fuselage skin was torn vertically. The door fractured and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath
The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.
The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the

nose. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.
At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.
The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.
The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.
The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force

disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast directly, leaving a wide debris field.
Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris.
Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.
Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.
Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Wiring/cargo door explanation evidence**

Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2000 23:30:14 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Wiring/cargo door explanation evidence
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Statement of Dr. Bernard S. Loeb
TWA flight 800 Board Meeting
August 22, 2000

We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact.

Dear Dr. Loeb and other members of NTSB, 22 August 2000

I have to refute the statement above by Dr. Loeb because it is refuted by NTSB facts below.

Side note on the side note: There was substantial evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door. The physical

evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact.

Substantial evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door.: Chart 12 of the Public Docket for TWA 800 prepared by NTSB: This substantial historical evidence shows that when a cargo door opens on an early model Boeing 747 shortly after takeoff a sudden loud sound occurs on the cockpit voice recorder. It happened on UAL 811 as confirmed by NTSB in AAR 92/02. It matches TWA 800 historically.

What is the physical/forensic evidence to back up the historical evidence?

The physical evidence below demonstrated that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact. Forward cargo door is in shattered pieces with many pieces, still unrecovered in NTSB photo below. Forward cargo door has ten latches but only eight have been recovered. Physical evidence as prepared by the NTSB is in the wreckage reconstruction of TWA 800 and shows shattered starboard side around forward cargo door and then the smooth port side of TWA 800 forward of the wing.

Nose to right above.

Nose to left above.

HIgh Resolution photo below shows huge amount of forensic physical evidence that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact. Note huge outward opening petal shaped

rupture at the forward midspan latch, one of two without locking sectors, and which was never recovered.

Dear Dr. Loeb and members of NTSB, to conclude,

You know the wiring/cargo door theory/explanation is plausible because it's happened before and it was the first thing you thought of. You know that a lot of the things that happened to UAL 811 happened to TWA 800. You know what happened to UAL 811, open cargo door in flight, and it may very well have happened again. Yes, probably wiring shorting on unlatch motor, yes, the locking sectors should have been on all the latches, not just the bottom eight. Yes, the center tank exploded, on the way down, ignited by engine number three which was fodded and on fire, just like UAL 811.

To be fair, to live the truth that you are aircraft accident investigators intent on determining the best probable cause after examining in detail, including interviews, all submitted explanations for TWA 800 to include center tank explosion, bomb in forward cargo hold, missile anywhere, electromagnetic interference, meteor, and wiring caused open cargo door in flight, you would contact me, email me, call me, interrogate me, drain me of everything I know about cargo doors opening in flight in Boeing 747s. I know a lot. I learned it from NTSB documents. You have not talked to me but still can. To be fair, you must follow up on substantiated leads.. Chairman Hall referred to me and my cargo door explanation at the beginning of the December 1997 hearings in Baltimore; Dr. Loeb referred to me in his opening remarks at the public hearing today. Yet, you have not talked to me as you have to hundreds of others with information

about TWA 800. Let me present the wiring/cargo door case. Let the evidence and analysis that I have researched and assembled be allowed to stand and be examined.

To reject the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 without interviewing me, without giving scientific explanations for the photos and chart above, and without recovering and examining the missing latches is to have conducted an incomplete investigation which may very well have concluded with the incorrect initial event for the probable cause for TWA 800. You have not turned over every stone. In fact, you have refused to turn over a stone right here and which you initially thought might be the right one, and one which I am again pointing to; turn it over, open forward cargo door in flight. Let the historical and forensic evidence speak.

Regards,

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Photos of ruptures at latches of TWA 800/ wiring/cargo door explanation.**

Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2000 09:55:37 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Photos of ruptures at latches of TWA 800/wiring/cargo door explanation.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear NTSB, you have not yet examined wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800. There are ten latches on that forward cargo door and you only have eight.

Below are high resolution photos of ruptures at midspan latches of TWA 800.

http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html

Forward midspan latch rupture, two photos.

http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html

Aft midspan latch rupture.

Final report in August? You have not yet thoroughly ruled out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800. You have attempted without success to rule in spontaneous center tank fire explosion as initial event.

Streak is pieces of fuselage near cargo door area being blown out and away and reflecting evening sunlight to observers down below.

The is still time to complete the report.

Cheers
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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

At 2:20 AM -0400 6/5/00, AVweb's AVflash wrote:
...TO RULE THEM OUT AS CAUSE ONCE AND FOR ALL
The missiles were fired in April at Eglin Air Force Base near Fort Walton Beach, Fla., to determine whether streaks of light

reported by
witnesses could have even been missiles and to establish a baseline of
what might have been visible of a shoulder-fired missile. The NTSB
plans to hold a final hearing on the crash in late August, when it will
determine a "probable cause." AVweb's NewsWire coverage at
<http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news/news0023a.html> contains details of
a proposal the FAA is considering that would cost millions but might
prevent another TWA Flight 800.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Sent June 97 and still valid, a real test for TWA 800 streak**

Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2000 17:29:28 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Sent June 97 and still valid, a real test for TWA 800 streak
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
To: DICKINAntsbgov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: It's not too late to get it right.
Cc:

Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson,

The first anniversary of the crash of TWA 800 is less than two months away. Many will be looking at the spot in the sky in which the 747 destructed. I suggest a recreation to test a hypothesis that a piece of the plane came off and reflected evening sunlight as it spun away appearing as a streak to ground observers and to also confirm the metal piece could be picked up on primary ATC radar.

The security guys are very good at recreating what they believe happened, bombs and missiles. Planes are being blown up and missiles fired at other planes. Let the mechanical proponents have an exercise in recreation.

Based upon the TWA 800 streak and mysterious blip at the same time, both could be related. What hypothesis could explain both? Cargo door could. It would be cheap, safe, and easy to test that idea. In the evenings before the anniversary, observations could be made of regular 747s taking off from Kennedy and passing the event spot at 13700 feet at 300 IAS. The large, short duration, sun reflective flash can be observed off the 747's forward fuselage, moving to engines, aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and winglets if 747-400. I have observed this flash many time from my vantage point living under a heavily travelled airway from SF to LA.

On the anniversary evening a C-130 carrying spare old 747 cargo doors or metal object of same size and shapes could fly at 13700 feet as fast as it could go, about 220 IAS, and at 8:31 PM on 17 July, lower the C-130 inward opening aft door and the crew could push out the eight foot by nine foot pieces of shiny radar and sun reflective metal. ATC radar and ground observers could watch to see the track of the object as it slows down

horizontally land speeds up vertically in a parabolic curve to the ocean surface. Radar tapes could then be analyzed to see if the object matches the blips before TWA 800 disappearance off scope. Ground observers can be queried to see if observed streak matches the TWA 800 streak. Several passes could be made in the sun reflective window between 8:20 to 8:50 PM.

A mechanical hypothesis would have been tested in a non destructive, safe, cheap, repeatable manner, inadvertent fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side. When the streak and radar blip are recreated at the same time and place as TWA 800, a strong case can be made that some part of the airframe flew off just before destruction and two mysteries solved.

We are dealing with life and death here so any effort is worth it to stop the death from happening again.

My goal is easier than yours. My goal is to persuade you that a worthy line of investigation for crash cause of TWA 800 is hull rupture forward of the wing on right side around cargo door. Your difficult task, if you were persuaded to investigate rupture area, would be to prove or disprove that explanation.

The big picture: From identifying the forest, individual trees make sense. A single tree examined alone does not reveal much. Here are the Boeing 747 trees and the forest they belong to:

TWA 800 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

PA 103 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

AI 182 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

UAL 811 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

There are other high time Boeing 747 ruptured hull crashes but they were not solo and they involved getting hit by lightning or flying into the water, the ground, or another airplane.

The only three that match TWA 800 are the above alone, sudden, and fatal hull ruptures.

You are on the scene and have seen two of the planes involved, TWA 800 and UAL 811. I contend that had UAL 811 had its

weakened nose torn off the sequence of destruction would match TWA 800. Could the weakened nose of 811 have torn off from the 300 knots IAS?

My cargo door explanation is based on the central intelligence of the similarities in solo pressurized hull ruptures. They all have common consequences and leave similar evidence. I included for background reference in my research the three DC-10 cargo door events. Also included in research was PA 125, a Boeing 747 leaking pressurized hull event.

The DC-10 hull ruptures occurred in the aft fuselage as shown by the evidence after the crashes.

The four Boeing 747 hull ruptures and the one leaking hull have all been located to a small area on the large 747: Forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where a huge square hole has been cut into the pressurized hull; the outward opening cargo door.

Let's get specific:

UAL 811, NTSB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on right side.

AI 182, Indian report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on the right side.

PA 103, AAIB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on left side followed immediately by right side rupture.

TWA 800, early New York Times article stated computer simulation located rupture forward of the wing on the right side.

(Documentation of sources is on web site www.corazon.com)

Now to the causes of the solo pressurized hull ruptures of the four planes above: Ah, the causes. It seems that such similar events would have a similar cause but that is not the official position.

The causes have been stated in reports as:

AI 182 as bomb in forward cargo hold or door.

PA 103 as bomb in forward cargo hold.

UAL 811 as bomb or door.
TWA 800 as bomb in forward cargo hold, missile striking forward of the wing on right side, fuel tank explosion severing nose forward of wing, or door.

If TWA 800 had been shown to be bomb then all would be right in the aircraft investigation world. Four catastrophic solo ruptures of 747s; three bombs and one door.

But TWA 800 has been shown not to be a bomb and all is not right in the aircraft investigation world. It doesn't make sense. Something's wrong. If 800 not a bomb, then maybe 103 and 183 not bombs? If not bomb, what?

Let's back up to big picture. The large forest of wide body solo hull ruptures includes three DC-10s and four Boeing 747s. The three DC-10s are definitely in the forest, but are the four Boeing 747s? What else is there to link them to include them as hull ruptures?

If the four Boeing 747 hull ruptures over eleven years can be shown to be extremely similar then they can be assumed to have one common cause. What is it?

I contend they are so similar that they have one common cause. The common cause is a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side. It sounds like a circle but that is an important point for us to agree on. Were there hull ruptures on the four planes and did they cause the accident? I say yes.

What caused the hull rupture at that location?

Well, every inch of that area must be examined closely. It is already a dangerous area. Section 41 retrofit was done to correct cracks near the rupture area. Several ADs were issued to correct faults in a door which may lead or did lead to a rupture in that area. The pear design at rupture location is not as strong as a circle or oval found aft, near identical door which has not failed in flight. Historically, hull ruptures have been near squarish corners of holes cut in the pressurized hull; there are squarish

corners of a big hole in the rupture area.

Regarding TWA 800, I am assuming the fireball and center tank explosion occurred after hull rupture, not before, based on eyewitness accounts of streak and altitude of fireball lower than that at rupture event. Radar data also supports hull rupture first, then, later and lower, center tank explosion. There was a hull rupture forward of the wing, severing the nose, the time and cause is unknown as this time. If the cause of the hull rupture for TWA 800, the streak, and the radar blip anomaly could all be explained by center tank explosion, and if the ignition source were known, then you would not have emailed me in exasperation about the latches being latched on the 800 door. Center tank explosion does not answer all the questions nor explain all the evidence and as an investigator you would like to have all the loose ends tied up. Me too.

NTSB has been right all along to say mechanical and center tank explosion. NTSB is still right and will be right, it was mechanical and there was a center tank explosion. There is no incompatibility.

Let's assume for purposes of this thoughtful reply, the fireball occurred later and lower than initial hull rupture.

A hull rupture would cause an explosive decompression which means a sudden loud sound.

1. There was a sudden loud sound on the four 747s CVRs.

A hull rupture would cause a large hole to open up forward of the wing on the right side.

2. There was a large hole on the right side, forward of the wing on the four 747s; the door hole and torn away associated fuselage skin.

At that rupture spot, a weakened nose could be torn off by the tremendous 300 knot slipstream and start a sequence after sudden loud decompression sound:

3. Power abruptly cut at main equipment compartment. All four

had abrupt power cut.

4. Passengers sucked out of large hole and ingested into number three engine. All four had at least nine missing, never recovered bodies.

5. Nose falls in dense area on surface. Nose fell in dense area on three planes, on other plane the nose stayed on.

6. Rest of plane disintegrates as it falls leaving wider spread debris pattern. Three had wide debris pattern for noseless planes, other plane kept nose on.

7. Engine number three FODs, catches fire and falls away to land alone. Three number three engines fell away to land separately, two were on fire. Number three engine FODDED on other plane but engine stayed on wing.

8. Inflight damage by debris more severe on right side. Three planes had more severe right side damage and maybe the fourth too.

9. All four planes had ground radar information at time of rupture. Three had nearby lone primary radar blip, the other might have had but was out of primary radar range.

Discussion: The abrupt power cut would prevent most information about the cause of the rupture from reaching alert lights, the FDR, ground control, or the crew. The streak of 800 was only because the light was such to reflect off the fuselage to ground observers. The other hull ruptures all occurred out of sight of land or at pitch dark.

(There are other similarities of the four not immediately connected to hull rupture: all were high time and took off at night, running behind schedule and with EPR gripes.)

I believe that that is enough significant similarities to state that the four high time Boeing 747 accidents were caused by hull rupture forward of the wing on right side.

If we agree on that, (and I'm sure we do for UAL 811 and AI 182, close on PA 103, and unknown on TWA 800,) then let us

consider very closely what needs to be done to determine why hull ruptured.

What causes pressurized hulls to rupture? Lots of reasons. Overpressure caused by bomb or malfunctioning airconditioning, structural defects, design errors, pressure miscalculations, missile penetration, midair collision, faulty windows or doors, and metal fatigue. The evidence must match the exact explanation to be satisfactory.

Submarines and planes are similar in that pressure is a huge consideration and often underestimated. Subs sink when valves are installed backwards. Planes crash when windows pop.

Ruptured hulls have been around as long as they have been pressurized. The Comet lesson was not learned by the 747. The DC-10 lesson was not learned by the 747. Do not cut outward opening large square holes in pressurized hulls. If they are cut then the incredible pressure will eventually force it open or the continued use will weaken the structure to failure.

To say a solo hull rupture is caused by large door opening inadvertently or metal fatigue is just to refer to precedent. It's happened before. It's a normal working hypothesis.

To say hull rupture was caused by center tank explosion by unknown ignition source is to be speculative.

A 747 has never had a center tank explosion of unknown origin in good weather. A 747 has had a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side by an inadvertently opened cargo door. There have been three other very similar accidents and none was a center tank explosion. They all could be structural failure at the rupture zone.

If a worthy line of investigation into the hull rupture of TWA 800 is a center tank explosion, or a bomb, or a missile, then it is certainly a worthy line of investigation to rule in or rule out inadvertent door opening, or metal fatigue, or structural failure at rupture location, forward of wing on right side.

To rule in or rule out rupture cause requires close examination of fuselage metal at corners of door to see if it matches the metal failure pattern of the corners of the squarish windows of the Comet. It requires close examination of the door latching mechanism to confirm the cam latches were latched around the locking pins. It requires examination of stringers, bulkheads, floor beams, skin, and panels for any preexisting failures. It requires close examination around lone mid span latch of door for failure. It requires examination of door seals for leaking and door frame for previous damage or out of rig condition.

Regarding the complex latching system of the forward cargo door: The problem is subtle. It is possible to say that the locking sectors of the door were in the locked position and yet, the door to be unlatched. The cam sectors around pins is the key item. Was the bottom of the 800 door sill attached to the door latches? Was the door found broken in pieces but unattached to any fuselage? Did the door break at the mid span point? Did the hinge at top of door tear away at corners? Were the locking sectors steel or aluminum?

The rupture evidence of the other crashes now becomes a help. The evidence at the rupture location of 800 can be compared with the evidence of 182, 103, and 811. For instance, the tearing pattern of the rupture location on right side of fuselage for 811 and 103 match almost perfectly, it may match 800 too.

The latch status of FCD of 182 and 103 were unreported, it needs to be determined.

Regarding TWA 800 specifically before fireball: All revealed evidence is consistent with hull rupture forward of wing caused by door failure:

1. Streak is shiny door departing in evening sun.
2. Radar blip is metal door reflecting primary radar energy.
3. Sudden loud sound is sudden loud decompression after door goes.

4. Engine number three would ignite disintegrating wing and fuselage into fireball.

After fireball, evidence is consistent with center tank explosion.

Soon to be revealed public docket should be very interesting to contemplate:

1. Engine breakdown report. (FOD on three?)
2. Item wreckage plot. (Door found where?)
3. CVR data. (Frequency match 103?)
4. FDR data. (Any EPR problems?)
5. Radar plots. (Blip close enough to be door?)
6. Photographs of reconstructed fuselage. (Pattern match 103?)
7. Crew conversation. (The last words of the 800 pilot were to initiate a pressure changing event just before his pressurized hull ruptured, "Climb.")

To summarize: A worthy line of investigation into the crash of TWA 800 is the examination of the rupture area forward of the wing on the right side; specifically the forward cargo door area, to rule out failure of door latching mechanism, or door frame at corners, or blow out at mid span, or other structural failure in fuselage. This recommendation is based upon striking similarities to three other solo ruptured fuselage accidents, none of which was a center tank explosion.

Please check out the cargo door area thoroughly for mechanical failures. Use hindsight and compare all aspects of the similar earlier crashes of AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 to TWA 800. Use history to refer to similar Comet crashes and DC-10 crashes.

Sudden catastrophic airplane crash: New boss same as the old boss: pressurized hull rupture.

Is it possible to determine in your mind, Mr. Dickinson, that TWA 800 had a hull rupture? Can you locate it? Can you offer some explanations? What needs to be done to confirm or rule out your explanations?

Let's talk by email or phone about airplane crashes, not

necessarily TWA 800. That's certainly appropriate after a public appeal for information by the NTSB. There is much to discuss. I am vitally interested in this probably because of my own military RA-5C crash in which my pilot died and I survived a night fatal fiery sudden jet crash.

We both have the same goal. Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan. Let us succeed and everyone will be happy up and down the line.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Wiring/cargo door for TWA 800**

Dear Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter
Someone will have to admit to being not exactly correct in

former statements about the forward cargo door on TWA 800. Pride comes before a fall and every investigation has a 'fall guy." (My vote is for Jim Wildey; just joking, Jim, we met and shook hands at the Baltimore hearing. I enjoyed and respect your opinions except for initial event of spontaneous center tank explosion.)

I ask Mr. Wildey to say that yes, based upon wreckage reconstruction showing shattered door and the fact that not all twenty of twenty door latches have been recovered, that forward cargo door could have ruptured in flight, . Twenty latches for two doors means each door has ten latches and they have not bee recovered. That's all I ask of Mr. Wildey, to say that yes, the door could have ruptured in flight. Then leave the cause why it opened for others to discern. Yes, some damage occurred when the fuselage hit the water leaving inward pillowing. Yes, eight latches have been recovered in a cargo door sill and they were latched. But, to rule out a possibility, there needs to be substantial evidence that the possibility could not have occurred, and with forward cargo door there is not substantial evidence that it did not rupture in flight because most of the hardware in the door is still missing. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that the door did rupture in flight based on photographs of actual ruptures in the TWA 800 door and the historical precedent of UAL 811.

I was not exactly correct for the cause of the ruptured cargo door and may still not be. I figured either pneumatic, hydraulic, electrical, crew, bomb, missile, center tank explosion, meteor, EMG, or other, to cause those midspan latches to rupture. Only electrical made sense because of UAL 811 but it was only after Baltimore and the great show that NTSB put on about aging aircraft and the faults of Poly X wiring did I now believe it was

Poly X wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture in flight for TWA 800.

But I could be wrong. It could have been the center tank explosion that blew open that nearby door. I'm not adamant about the cause of the ruptured cargo door in flight, only that it did happen and was not all latched and all intact at water impact.

And therein lies the open mind perception: A center tank explosion could have ruptured that door to rupture, as the photos show. If the door ruptured in flight, then all plausible causes must be examined, and they have not been examined. Why reject an alleged event such at ruptured cargo door if the official version of spontaneous center tank explosion could have caused it?

Mr. Wildey, please state that based upon a new interpretation of existing facts, that a new sequence could be possible. The new sequence states that the center tank explosion was not the initial event and was a symptom, not a cause of the accident. The ruptured cargo door was a symptom, not a cause. The cause is Poly X wiring, a cause NTSB and FAA and Boeing and I all agree with.

Please indicate, Mr. Wildey, that after looking at the photographs and checking the number of latches that were recovered, that that door could have ruptured in flight. If you allow that, Mr. Wildey, that will allow the aircraft accident investigators to go back in to TWA 800 and consider an explosive decompression event when a huge hole appeared in fuselage, just forward of the wing.

Mr. Schalekamp can still say, yes, at first look, it did appear that the door showed an outward explosive force.

Can somebody ask Mr. Ron Schleede to come out of retirement and compare UAL 811 and TWA 800? Can Mr. Schleede have the opportunity to reconsider his statement that a cargo door was locked and latched after only looking at one of two door sills and knowing that most of both doors are still missing including suspect latches at midspan? That conclusion of locked and latched was made just as the pieces of wreckage were being brought in and long before the reconstruction was complete showing the shattered door and missing pieces. He should be permitted an opportunity to reassess his opinion of all locked and latched based on current evidence.

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
>To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
>Subject: RE: TWA crash cause
>Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400

>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!
> ----------
>From: barry
>To: SCHLEDR
>Subject: TWA crash cause
>Date: Tuesday, 30 July, 1996 01:48

>http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html is my website for cargo door
>crash theory.

>To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
>From: barry@corazon.com
>Subject: Which cargo door and cam positions
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:

>
>Mr. Schleede, thank you for your prompt response.
>>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!
>There are three cargo doors on TWA 800, which one are you talking about.
>The front cargo door is reported to be in pieces, your sentence above implies one piece which would means other than front cargo door checked.
>The lock sectors are locked, but the cams are unlocked. You do not mention cams.
> What are the positions of the cam locks of the forward cargo door?
John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT
Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.
Thanks for the interest.

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400
Encoding: 129 TEXT
Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came
off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by
the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items memtioned in your letter.
Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Mr. Dickinson, a depressurization event such as proposed for TWA 800 and experienced by UAL 811 was noticed by the crew and recorded on the CVR. That sudden loud sound on the CVR on TWA 800 and UAL 811 is the sudden outflow of air molecules trying to equalize the low pressure on the outside of the fuselage. Many of the door/hatch/access/panel/windows were recovered but many crucial ones are still missing and probably would indicate they came from the aircraft prior to the initial event. if recovered The 'red zone' is full of pieces of TWA 800 forward of the wing and from the forward cargo bay. The trajectory study indicates that the first objects to leave the aircraft came from forward of the wing. Mr. Dickinson, would you indicate that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 could have ruptured in flight? If you do that, the wiring/cargo door explanation may get the attention it deserves.

Somebody, please, own up to the obvious: That forward cargo

door area of TWA 800 is shattered, it's wrecked, it shows inward pillowing on the skin and shows outward petal shaped bulge rupture at midspan latches, it has paint smears, it has missing midspan latches as well as missing manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors and most of the skin. That door should be a focus of attention and receive the same type of examination as that received by the door of UAL 811 such as an extensive metallurgical testing and examination and report. And it's not there for TWA 800. It is for UAL 811 and NTSB AAR 90/01 and NTSB AAR 92/02. Bomb and missile and EMG are wacky, little supporting evidence, not plausible, but possible and were thus thoroughly investigated by NTSB. Wiring/cargo door is sane, common sense, has happened before, plausible, and has much evidence to support it and yet has not been thoroughly investigated but fobbed off with a few sentences which are not supported by facts. Why is that?

The door is a problem on TWA 800, it was a problem on UAL 811, it can be a problem in the future. The wiring around the cargo door area needs to be inspected for cracks in the insulation to bare wire. It's been done already for TWA 800 and yes, cracked insulation in the wire was found in the cargo door area. Inspection has not been done for other 747s. The FAA could issue an AD to inspect the wiring around the cargo door area for early model 747s, inspecting the areas of wiring which have been shown to be chafed to bare in the past for UAL 811 and TWA 800:

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service

problems:
-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.
(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)
-Random flaking of the topcoat.
-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.
Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A for TWA 800 continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A for TWA 800 continues, page 116:
"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."
(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.
Will a junior or senior safety official contact me? Can a senior safety official order an investigation into allegations supported

by NTSB photos and public docket exhibits that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 ruptured in flight? Can a senior safety official order wiring inspections in and around forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747s?

Can something be done? Somehow, can that forward cargo door and wiring be full investigated? Can someone call me to get it started? Sometime is better than no time. There is still time right now before the final report goes to press.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
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barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Can't have it both ways**

Dear Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter

3 October 2000

TWA 800 explanation that rules out ruptured forward cargo door in flight contains a basic contradictory paradox which refutes the claim that it was all latched and all intact at water impact.

You will note in the photos above of the actual forward cargo door area of TWA 800 that contains outward petal shaped rupture opening at the midspan latch and also note the inward pillowing on the door and adjacent fuselage skin.

Well, it is impossible for the water impact to do the inward pillowing and the outward explosion at the same time at water impact. Your rejection of the wiring/cargo door explanation can't have it both ways and remain logical and plausible.

The wiring/cargo door explanation does remain plausible and logical: In flight rupture/opening of forward cargo door inflight at the midspan latches which caused outward petal shaped rupture, supported by paint smears and missing latches. Then the door shattered into the many pieces as shown by wreckage reconstruction. Then the water impact of the pieces which caused the inward pillowing of the pieces as shown by photo.

Rupture outward at latches in flight/shattering pieces/water impact pillowing on pieces.

That's the sequence that makes sense and does not contradict the laws of physics.

Your explanation of evidence above of inward pillowing and outward shattering at same time at water impact is a physical impossibility and strains the credulity and patience of any competent aircraft investigator.

You want it both ways, inward/outward, to support your explanation of spontaneous center tank explosion and to rule out

wiring/cargo door explanation but you can't have it both ways if you want to remain credible and keep the respect of the NTSB and FAA.

The evidence is above and can not be refuted. To continue to reject the wiring/cargo door explanation and not interview the messenger is not right. You can make it right by doing the thing that aviation accident investigators do, evaluate every reasonable explanation for a probable cause of an airplane accident. Wiring/ cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is that reasonable explanation that has not been thoroughly evaluated and should be and can be.

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Let us meet to discuss my theory**

Russ Young
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group Communications
(425) 237-0223

Dear Mr. Young, in the light of the continuing investigation into China Airlines Flight 611, do you know see a reason to meet with me to discuss my theory? My web site has the continued matches to United Airlines Flight 811 and others.

I'm still here and still willing to talk about aviation safety. Can't hurt to listen now, can it? We are both on the same side.

Cheers,
Barry

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www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: "Young, Russell" <Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com>
To: "'barry@corazon.com'" <barry@corazon.com>
Cc: "'Al Dickinson'" <dickina@ntsb.gov>
Subject: FW: For Russ Young of Boeing Safety Office
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1998 10:42:46 -0700
X-Priority: 3
MIME-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent e-mail message, as well as the hard copy you
sent by U.S. Mail.

Although I admire your interest in enhancing air safety, I see no reason
for us to meet to discuss your theories. A variety of qualified Boeing
employees -- including air safety investigators and structures engineers
-- have already examined your web site and read the materials you
distributed at the public hearing into TWA 800 last December in
Baltimore. I also know of at least two occasions when you have talked
with Boeing accident investigators about your theories. They have all
reached the same conclusion: your theories do not explain what happened
to Pan Am 103 or Air India 182, nor are they consistent with what is

known about TWA 800.

The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation into the TWA
800 tragedy continues, with Boeing participating as a party to the investigation. If you have any new information that you have not already shared with the NTSB, I suggest that you contact the investigator-in-charge, Al Dickinson.

Russ
Russ Young
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group Communications
(425) 237-0223

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Ruptures at forward cargo door, wiring/cargo door explanation**

Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2000 05:45:03 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Ruptures at forward cargo door, wiring/cargo door explanation
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Above is from AAR 92/02 page 36, and is forward cargo door of UAL 811, a 747 whose nose stayed on, showing the rupture at the aft midspan latch. This door is less shattered than TWA 800 because all of the latches on 811 unlatched, including the bottom

eight, allowing entire door to open. These bottom eight latches later had the AD to strengthen their locking sectors with steel. The middle ruptures, aft and forward midspan, for TWA 800 were more intense since the bottom eight latches stayed latched, as the NTSB says they were, allowing all the air pressure to attempt to equalize through the two midspan latches. There were no locking sectors to strengthen the midspan latches so whatever the AD was meant to do, it did not apply to the midspan latches.

Dear NTSB, it's not too late. Check out the wiring/cargo door explanation as it should be checked out. The rupture photographs alone for TWA 800 are enough to justify a complete effort worthy of the one for bomb, missile, or center tank. The model AAR is the UAL 811 report, AAR 92/02, available at corazon.com.

Yes, NTSB got it partially wrong with AAR 90/01 the first time with the probable cause being improper latching, but, NTSB being a fine safety organization who puts truth and accuracy ahead of pride, admitted the partial error and consequently wrote another AAR, 92/02, giving wiring/switch as the probable cause of the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Try the wiring/cargo door hypothesis and ask questions based upon that premise. I can answer them. The wiring/cargo door explanation clears up mysteries for TWA 800, some asked and some not.

Why the red paint smears on white paint mainly above the forward cargo door?
What is ignition source for the center tank explosion?
Why were bodies not burned around center tank?
Why were some pieces of metal around the center tank not

sooted?
Why was engine number three sooty inside and have missing blades?
How did the piece of engine blade get into the right horizontal stabilizer?
Why were the first pieces to leave TWA 800 just forward of the wing?
Why does sudden loud sound on CVR match that of UAL 811 sudden loud sound?
Why does abrupt power cut to FDR match that of UAL 811 abrupt power cut?
What caused streak?
Why was bomb suspected for so long?
Why did nose come off?
Why was bare wire found in cargo door area?

All above answered by wiring/cargo door explanation.

Above shows TWA 800 rupture at forward midspan latch of forward cargo door, outward petal shaped bulge, paint smears as door below slams upward, missing latches, shattered condition of door and missing manual locking handle and torque tubes, bellcranks, and viewing ports and overpressure relief doors, all missing from reconstruction, database, or discussion in exhibits.

Ah, but the facts are there for wiring/cargo door, but so what? What are the emotional, political, economic impacts of wiring/cargo door, the big picture, if you will.

I do not want to enter the black hole of conspiracy. I will not believe that Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede,

Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter believe in wiring/ cargo door explanation but are keeping it a secret or trying to project an explanation, such as center tank explosion, they know is wrong. I do believe that safety officials are trying to let a sleeping dog lie where it is, and that is wiring/cargo door explanation.

I do not believe that safety officials believe that a Poly X wiring insulated wire shorted on a door unlatch motor for TWA 800 which turned ten latches to the open position, and thankfully, the bottom eight had locking sectors of steel from an AD but unthankfully, the two midspan latches of the forward cargo door did not have locking sectors and ruptured in flight suddenly allowing the entire starboard side of fuselage forward of the wing to shatter, and nose comes off, and engines catch fire and blow up disintegrating fuel tanks, and pieces of metal fly off to reflect as a streak in the orange sunset sky and sudden loud sound on CVR...and on and on. And believe it but are trying not to allow the information to be analyzed properly. There is no cover up of previous errors of judgment.

I think everyone in official world thinks it was spontaneous center tank explosion from unknown mysterious ignition source and that no way, absolutely no way, did that forward cargo door open in flight. The photo of shattered skin shows what happened after that all latched and all intact door hit the ocean. It's coincidence that the CVR and FDR match a previous cargo door event. The outward opening petal shaped rupture at the forward midspan latch of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 was caused by water entering the intact door area when it hit and the water gushed out at the midspan latches causing the outward ruptures.

Well, when I look at it that way, it is not a stretch to ignore, reject the wiring/cargo door explanation when based on false logic, hasty opinion, and denial of in your face evidence.

Wiring/cargo door explanation does require a ruptured forward cargo door in flight And the actual photo of the actual door area of the actual Boeing 747 called TWA 800 shows a ruptured cargo door.

So, how can the facts be so clear and yet so rejected?

Wishful thinking? Not conspiracy, please please please.

Is that wishful thinking that the answer to the mystery of cause of TWA 800 crash belongs to NTSB and not FBI, and certainly not citizen working on his own? Well, that would be pride. And pride comes before a fall, or so they say.

To protect Boeing as the manufacturer will extinct Boeing the way it's going. No airline is going to buy an airplane from a company and then charged with murder if the plane crashes, or bankrupted when sued, or reputation destroyed. The basic design flaw is outward opening nonplug doors, any kind of door. All this latch and lock sector stuff is an attempt to correct that design flaw. As long as latches and cams and bellcranks and locking sectors are used to close a nonplug door, sooner or later, the nonplug door pops open, somehow, someway.

Boeing should know that planes crash and the way around that is to find out what's wrong and fix it. (Note Boeing does not agree with the center tank as initial event explanation. I am not alone.)

Protect the reputation of NTSB? This wiring/cargo door

explanation for TWA 800 would enhance NTSB's reputation. They did UAL 811 which allowed civilian citizens, the Campbells, to put it all together. To now check out the wiring/ cargo door explanation would mean that NTSB checked every possible explanation and at the last minute, went back and rechecked the initial explanation for TWA 800, forward cargo door opening in flight. And Bingo, it all made sense with the new added information such as engine breakdown report, wreckage database, and CVR, FDR data readouts.

Elections coming up? Does that affect TWA 800? Well, if there is a change of administrations, then when I go back with this same data to new appointees, the response may be different and wiring/cargo door does get looked into.

Emotional impacts? Deep well earned satisfaction of following a problem right to the end. And as far as the Poly X wiring culprit, NTSB has already investigated in depth the innocent evils of that particular insulation. The wiring company did not intentionally make wiring that easily chafed, become worn after vibration and wore down to bare metal and exposure to water.

Well, actually, kind officials, I'm out of my area when it comes to emotional impacts and money, sort of like sporting events, elections, and the stock market, do opposite what I say.

But I do know airplanes and in particular, cargo doors on Boeing 747s. The below officials' responses about that door are inadequate to rule it out as a cause for TWA 800. The responses are low on facts and high on opinion. The few facts given are wrong and if the opinions are based on those errors, then the opinion is wrong too. Saying the door was all latched and all intact at water impact does not make it so, especially when

contradicted by actual photographs of the actual wreckage of the actual airplane.

References to forward cargo door sill from FAA:
29 Oct 97 letter from Mr. Wojnar/Pederson/Breneman to JBS:
"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water." "However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

"However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side."

False, wreckage of most of the door is missing and damage is inward and outward on the right side.

18 Nov 96 letter from Mr. McSweeny/Kirkpatrick, FAA, to Congressman Farr:
"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

False and the above photo is evidence enough.

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS:
"While no scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center wing tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

Outward explosion yes but recanted later for unknown reasons.

"You may not agree with the reasoning of the official accident investigators, but I want you to understand the evidence to date indicates that the CWT explosion preceded any fuselage breakup, including damage to the forward cargo door."

Opinion.

19 Feb 1998 letter from Mr. Neil Schalekamp to JBS:
"The theory of an explosive decompression, due to a sudden opening of the forward cargo door was one theory that was examined. However, it has been determined that this did not occur. Based upon the existing evidence, the National Transportation Safety Board, (NTSB), the agency in charge of the accident investigation, believes that the probable cause of the

accident was a center wing fuel tank (CWT) explosion, due to an internal fuel tank ignition source. The FAA agrees with the NTSB on this matter.

What? agrees with internal fuel tank ignition source whose identity has eluded the best minds in the business for four years?

You apparently believe that the forward cargo door precipitated the accident scenario by initially separating from the airplane. The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the plane impacted the ocean."

Absolutely incorrect, the door was not attached and not latched at all latches and the photo above is evidence enough.

References about forward cargo door from NTSB:
24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:
"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Absolutely incorrect, 95% was not recovered, not even 60% of

both doors was recovered. Missing items of aft door: midspan latches, manual locking handle, torque tubes, viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, approximately twenty percent of door skin.

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:
"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Early on, before wreckage database and CVR and FDR analysis, a hasty decision was made based upon the examination of one door sill, that the forward cargo door was latched and locked and all intact at water impact. That early decision is absolutely incorrect.

19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to JBS:
"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

Opinion.

12 January 1998 letter from Jim Wildey, NTSB, to JBS:
"The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo

door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility."

Opinion.

10 March 1998 letter from John B. Drake, NTSB, to JBS:
"As we have stated in numerous previous responses, the investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility."

Opinion.

4 Mar 98 letter to me from Senator John McCain stating, "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:
"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Prompt denial, yes.

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:
10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :
"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

And there you have it, gentlemen of the public safety Board, keyword Safety. "Expect no further response" from the Safety Board. What were the responses in the first place? Door was all latched and all intact at water impact? That's your story and you're sticking to it? No additional evidence or analysis which comes along to contradict the center tank explanation and supports wiring/cargo door explanation will be considered? Closed minds? I think so.

There you have it, no meeting with NTSB with me, no further responses from NTSB to me, and no questions to anybody. I should be flattered. But I don't take it personally, it's not me that NTSB is afraid of, terrified of, that they will not face me, it's the idea. It's the idea of something that was not supposed to happen again, happened again. My idea of wiring/cargo door is the bogeyman NTSB is running from, not me. I am trivial as a messenger; the idea is the killer. Explosive decompression that mimics a bomb when it goes off and yet isn't a bomb, is the idea. ADs that don't fix the problem they are supposed to fix is the idea. Conclusions that are made in haste based on insufficient and not corrected later is the idea that is attempting to see light

but is rejected.

And so, wiring/cargo door explanation just sits there in your minds as a possible explanation for TWA 800. And you know it. You all know it because you all can look at pictures as above and realize, that door may have exploded open in flight. It makes a lie of the entire mission of NTSB, to independently and exhaustively consider all plausible explanations for an aircraft accident. That has not been done for wiring/cargo door for TWA 800 and you know it. You know how to do it right by looking at AAR 92/02 and reading about cams and torque tubes and manual locking handles, all of which are missing for both doors, not just the forward. You have made errors of judgment before on that pesky door with AAR 90/01 but did the noble thing and corrected the error with a new AAR. At that time, there was no one saying it was not improper latching except for a couple whose son had died, the Campbells. And sure enough, they were right, just as I am right, wiring shorted on the forward unlatch motor and ruptures occurred at both midspan latches, as seen in photographs of wreckage reconstruction.

Well, these mechanically caused accidents have a way of reoccurring, it's inevitable because machines are consistent, they do the same things under the same conditions. The conditions are high time early model Boeing 747s using Poly X wiring and sooner or later, bare wire is exposed and shorted against metal fuselage, probably in the presence of condensation water, and things happen that aren't supposed to happen, such as a motor turning on. And the destruction sequence starts again.

My conscience is clear. I have done all that can be expected of a citizen with a lifetime of experience in aviation and has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash presenting over a decade

of research and analysis using official reports to offer the wiring/cargo door explanation for sudden fiery night fatal jet plane crashes to transportation safety board and federal aviation safety officials for investigation and action.

I really feel as if the death warrants for hundreds of passengers will be signed as soon as I give up trying to persuade officials to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation. So I can't give up. I will continue to mail photos, text, analysis, and evidence interpretation to NTSB and FAA. Sooner or later, I believe, I will come across an official who understands drag, lift, and thrust, explosive decompression, and electricity and has some sort of innate sense of responsibility to the ignorant public at large to check out all plausible possibilities, not just prosecute the favored one. That person is is the one with the open mind and I will be able to immediately identify that person and will give him/her all the answers then need to the questions they ask.

So far, I have not me that safety official, but I will not give up, after all, it is a life and death matter, I should know, I have been there, I have been to the life and death location, I was the life and my pilot was the death. I have come back and am telling you that wiring/cargo door problem is destroying high time Boeing 747s and it's not a bomb, or a missile, or a spontaneous center tank explosion caused by mystery ignition source; it's wiring shorting on door unlatch motor which causes ruptures at midspan latches leading to catastrophic explosive decompression. And if you want to see what that looks like, just look at the photo above. The explosion shatters the local door area into many pieces, most of which never get recovered.

Well, these letters should make good reading for future safety officials to know what not to do: Ignore a motivated citizen with

access to the internet for research, time to do it, money to pay for travel and copies of documents, tons of experience in evaluation of plane crashes, and with an explanation that is plausible, makes sense, not loaded with conspiracy nonsense, and supported by text, evidence, and photographs.

No further response? Is that the attitude of a questioning safety body with an open investigation on their hands with a favored probable cause that has a huge problem? No further response? When the previous responses were limited and based on hasty conclusions? Apparently so, and that is sad. It doesn't have to be that way. Every stone can be turned over and the underside examined. It's not too late although I have to say, it's getting closer to too late every day. I imagine the trial of TWA 800 will be the next forum to expound the wiring/cargo door explanation, there must be someone on trial for their freedom and money that will hear me out about the wiring/cargo door explanation, especially if they are blamed for starting a fire they didn't set.

Cheers,
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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Latches and sill missing from cargo doors of TWA 800**

Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2000 11:26:58 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Latches and sill missing from cargo doors of TWA 800
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000

Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter

To properly rule out a suspect, (forward cargo door opening in flight), that suspect must have an airtight alibi and the story checks out, especially if the suspect is the prime suspect. Well, for the forward cargo door, prime suspect, former killer, the story does not check out; the alibi is full of holes, literally, and the evidence in hand points right to it.

Look at the photo of the door and its adjacent area particularly to

the left of "RF25":

Prima Facie evidence shows the door to be shattered. Water impact would push it inward, as is shown on some shattered pieces. That was water impact. However, there are outward ruptures at the midspan latches Photo above shows forward midspan latch area ruptured outward. Aft midspan latch shattered area and outward bulge petal shape rupture shown below in NTSB photo

For all 747s there are twenty latches, two sills, and sixteen locking sectors on two identical main cargo doors. For TWA 800 not all have been recovered to be examined and deemed normal and therefore able to rule out open cargo door in flight.

For the forward door of TWA 800, according to NTSB written documents of Exhibit 15C and wreckage database, original and updated, only eight of the ten latches, one sill, and eight locking sectors have been recovered and examined. That's not enough for a thorough examination of a former prime suspect.

UAL 811 shows a proper examination of a forward cargo door mechanical aspects:

Note excerpt for UAL 811, a confirmed open cargo door event.

The forward mid-span latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft mid-span latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during

latching.

For UAL 811, a proper examination of the mechanical aspects of the suspected forward cago door:

NTSB/AAR-92/02
(SUPERSEDES NTSB/AAR-90/01)

1.16.1 Cargo Door Hardware Examinations
1.16.1.1 Before Recovery of the Door
The following forward cargo door closing and latching components were returned to the Safety Board's Materials Laboratory for analysis after they were documented in place on the airplane:
Two pull-in hook pins, one from the lower end of the forward side of the door body cutout forward frame, and one from the lower end of the aft side of the body cutout aft frame, with housings;
Two mid-span pins, one from the forward side of the door body cutout forward frame, and one from the aft side of the door body cutout aft frame.
All components were initially examined while installed on the airplane. All eight forward cargo door latch pins, with housings, were removed for further laboratory examination. Also, for comparison, one of the latch pins, with housing, from the aft cargo door was also removed. For orientation purposes, the eight lower latch pin assemblies are referred to by number, with the No. 1 latch pin being the most forward on the lower door sill, and the No. 8 pin being the most aft. When referencing a circumferential location on the latch pins or mid-span pins, a

clock position was used. The clock code was oriented looking forward with 12 o'clock being straight up and 9 o'clock being directly inboard.

Based on the orientation of the latching mechanisms, the fully unlatched latching cams would first contact the latch pins from about the 1:15 o'clock position to the 7:15 position as the door was closed. As the cams are being latched around the pins, they would rotate approximately 80(, making contact with the pins from about the 4:15 position to the 10:15 position (See figure 7).

Detailed examination of the exposed surface of the pins (the portion of the pins extending from the housings) revealed various types of wear and damage. In general, all of the forward door cargo latch pins had smooth wear over the entire portion of the pin area contacted by the cams during normal closing and opening of the door. The pins also had distinct roughened (smeared) areas between the 6:15 and the 7:30 positions (See figure 8). The roughened areas had evidence of "heat tinting" and transfer of cam material to the surface of the pins. On pins 1 and 8 the roughened areas extended past the pin bottom to the 5:00 position. The 7:30 position approximately corresponds to the area on the pin where the lower surface of the cam would be relative to the pin when the latch cams are in the unlatched or nearly unlatched position.

The forward pull-in hook pin was not significantly bent, but the structure to which it was attached was deformed outward, so the hook pin was deflected significantly outward. Three of the four bolts holding the aft pull-in hook pin had sheared, so the hook pin was also deflected outward. Both hook pin ends were damaged, but neither pin was significantly deformed along its length. There was significant heat tinting on the damaged area of the forward hook pin. Boeing engineering calculations determined that the pull-in hook pins would fail at a 3.5 psi differential cabin pressure with the latch cams unlatched.

The forward mid-span latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft mid-span latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during latching.

1.16.1.2 After Recovery of the Door

The documentation of the recovered cargo door was divided into four areas: 1) door structure, 2) master latch lock system, 3) latch system, and 4) hook system. A description of the recovered door follows.

1. Door Structure:

The cargo door had fractured longitudinally near the mid-span lap joint near stringer 34R, just beneath the mid-span torque tubes. Except for an area of missing skin between frames 2 and 3 and a portion of frame webs where the upper latch lock torque tube had torn out, the frames and skin of the upper door piece mated to the lower door piece.2 Several areas of the upper door skin along the longitudinal fracture were bent back. In addition, a large area of lower door skin between frame 6 and the aft door edge had peeled downward from the fracture line. The two door pieces are shown together in Figures 9 and 10. Examinations of the fracture surfaces of the skin and frames revealed no evidence of pre-existing cracks. All fractures were typical of overstress separation.

Seven of the eight lock sector slots in the lower beam showed evidence of contact and scraping by the lock sectors. Only the No. 1 lock sector slot was undamaged, although the bracket forward and above the No. 1 slot did appear to have been damaged by contact from the lock sector (slots numbered 1-8, forward-aft). The direction of the scraping on the slots could not be determined conclusively.

The decal covering the latch actuator manual drive port was found broken circumferentially around the edge of the port cover, which was loose and rotated from its normal position (See figure

11). There was an impression in the decal similar to a Phillips-head screw slot in line with the center of the retainer screw securing the cover. There was also a 0.06-inch-long linear slit from 10 to 4 o'clock approximately centered over the retainer screw head (See figures 12 and 13). There was no rotational tearing and no loss of decal material in the area covering the screw head location. During examinations of the door at Boeing, it was noted that the retainer bracket on the inside of the latch actuator manual drive port cover was bowed outward; the port cover was not deformed. The retainer bracket on the inside of the hook actuator manual drive port cover was similarly bowed outward, and the port cover was bowed outward.

The hinge that attaches the cargo door to the fuselage is comprised of several hinge sections--those attached along the upper edge of the cargo door and those along the fuselage just above the cargo door cutout--interconnected with hinge pins. The hinge pins and all hinge sections from N4713U's forward cargo door were intact; all hinge sections rotated relatively easily. All attach bolts from the hinge sections on the door remained attached; conversely, no bolts remained attached to the hinge sections on the fuselage. Several areas on the hinge sections, such as the fuselage hinge sections, showed evidence of contact from the door during overtravel (See figure 14). In addition, the fuselage forward hinge sections

were slightly bent. The upper flange of the door, to which the door hinges are attached, was not deformed. The forward cargo door can rotate open 143 degrees before the hinge would deform, permitting the door to contact the fuselage above.

Examination of the outer skin contour of the upper door piece revealed that it had been crushed inward. There were also many areas on the outer skin where blue and red paint transfer marks could be seen. These marks were generally forward of the aft pressure-relief door, and the blue marks were located above the

red marks. The UAL paint pattern incorporates red and blue stripes along the fuselage above the cargo door. Figure 15 is a plot of the documented paint marks on the upper door piece. There was no evidence of the pressure relief door shrouds found on the forward door; however, most of the inner door lining to which the shrouds attach was missing.

2. Master Latch Lock System:

All eight lock sectors were found in the locked position--actually past the fully locked position. They had been pulled through the lock sector slots in the lower beam of the cargo door. (When they are fully locked, the lock sectors should be recessed in the lower beam approximately 3/8 inch). All lock sectors had deflected off the high shoulder of the latch cams due to interference with the partially unlatched cams. Prior to disassembly of the components, the interference between the cams and the lock sectors was removed by rotating the cams to the latched position. Examination of the lock sectors disclosed that the bottom of the lower arm of each lock sector was gouged. For seven of the eight lock sectors, the distance from the main gouge area to the location of the interference between the latch cam and the lock sector was approximately 0.75 inch. (The No. 2 lock sector was corroded and had fractured at the location of the large gouge common to the other seven lock sectors. Consequently, it was not in contact with the No. 2 latch cam when the door was retrieved). The master latch lock handle housing and trigger were found relatively flush with the door outer skin. The top of the handle was recessed approximately 0.50 inch inward from flush, and the bottom of the handle was protruding approximately 0.40 inch outward from flush (See figure 16). This

Figure 15.--Documented paint marks on outer skin of upper door piece. Dashed line is approximately 8 degrees from horizontal.

position of the handle indicates that the lock sectors were in a position past fully locked. The fuse pin was found in three pieces

but was heavily corroded. The handle housing was undamaged. Two of the three connecting rods between the master latch lock handle and the lock sector torque tube were bowed slightly, but they were otherwise intact. No deformation was observed on any section of the lock sector torque tube, although one of the six bearings assembled on the torque tube had been damaged. The No. 3 bearing inner race and its torque tube locator sleeve were displaced forward approximately 0.20 inch from the bearing housing centerline. The outer race was broken and pushed forward out of the housing.

The lower two connecting rods between the lock sector torque tube and the torque tube below the pressure-relief doors were undamaged; however, the upper connecting rod had separated at the upper, tapered end. The torque tube below the pressure-relief doors were missing, and the pressure-relief door connecting rods had separated at the lower, tapered end. The remaining portion of each rod was undamaged, but the forward pressure-relief door was jammed open into the cutout.

3. Latch System:

All eight lower latch cams were found in a nearly unlatched position, and all of them were binding against the lock sectors except the No. 2 cam (lock sector No. 2 had broken). Latch cams 1-6 were approximately 62 degrees from the fully latched position, and cams 7 and 8 were approximately 70 degrees from fully latched. Full rotation of the latch cams is 80 degrees. Several of the lower latch cams contained compression and smearing damage on the lower lip of the latch cam cavity ("lower" relative to an open cam). This damage is consistent with the forceful movement of the cams across the latch pins.

The four rods between the latch actuator torque tube and the four bellcranks containing the latch cams were attached and undamaged. No section of the latch actuator torque tube was damaged, and the bearings/supports along the tube were intact.

The latch actuator was removed and later disassembled. No anomalies were found.

4. Pull-in Hook System:

The forward and aft pull-in hooks were found near the closed position. Both of them exhibited wear patterns consistent with contact with the pull-in hook pins during door operation. For both the forward and aft hooks, the inboard edge of the pull-in hook channel contained compression and smearing damage consistent with a forceful movement of the hooks over the pins while the hooks were in the closed or nearly closed position.

Gentlemen,

TWA 800 investigation was extensive but not complete. The wiring/cargo door explanation needs examination. All ten latches were not recovered, all then were not examined, all ten were not given the type of examination that was given to UAL 811, a high time 747 that had a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR when its cargo door opened in flight and which forensic evidence matches TWA 800.

Why do you not contact me? Why do you not interview me and ask me to rubut any questions or contradiction or impossibilities in the wiring/cargo door explanation?

Door all latched and intact at water impact is wrong, it is not the opinion of an aircraft accident investigator who understands explosive decompression and knows the history of it dating back to the mid '50s and the Comet.

The evidence, the real and historical evidence that can be seen with your own eyes and listened to with your own ears says the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight and why it

opened is a good question. I vote for the UAL 811 NTSB second explanation of electrical and not improperly latched, or bomb, or missile, or center tank explosion or other.

To reject the wiring/cargo door explanation based upon a falsehood is a serious error. The falsehood is the forward cargo door was all latched, locked, intact at water impact. That is based upon the false data of all ten latches of the forward door recovered and examined and found to be locked and normal; and that the shattered areas of the door were caused by water impact when the ruptures at the midspan latches were outward.

The eight bottom cams have locking sectors to prevent the latches from unlocking once the unlatch motor gets shorted on by fault. That AD was done after UAL 811, but the killer here is that the two midspan latches never had and still don't have locking sectors. So when all ten try to unlatch, as they are told to do by the unlatch motor, the bottom eight hold true, while the two midspan just have to unlatch enough to go over dead center and the 38115 and more pounds of internal pressure push out the rest of the door.

Yes, the two midspan latches are the only ones without locking sectors, a design flaw that is only equalled by have the huge doors non-plug.

To reject an explanation with precedent, which explains the streak, and identifies the mystery ignition source, which based upon wishful thinking of having all the latches, cams, torque tubes, manual locking handle, and latch pins upon which to base a rejection, is terribly terribly wrong when you don't have the manual locking handle, all ten latches, cams, or latch pins.

You don't have the evidence which would lead you to dismiss/ reject/rebut the wiring/cargo door explanation.

However, the wiring/cargo door explanation has massive historical and forensic evidence to support such a claim, starting with photographs above which show a very shattered starboard side forward of the wing cargo door area and, for comparison, a very smooth port side.

Starboard side above showing shattered cargo door area just forward of wing.

Below is what all that NTSB has to say about the forward cargo door and its ten latches:

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

Wreckage database does not have full complement of sills, latches, or cams.

Regarding the recent response of Shelly Hazle of NTSB with the below excerpt:

"For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door

might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

Note that nowhere is there the claim that the two midspan latches have been recovered, only ignored or ruled unimportant. Ruled unimportant by Ms. Hazle, not an aircraft accident investigator.

The forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened/shattered/ruptured in flight and it started at the midspan latches, just like UAL 811.

That claim must be investigated as thoroughly as any other plausible explanation for TWA 800. Wiring/cargo door has not been given that same standard of investigation. The investigation is incomplete and unworthy of NTSB to make final as it stands.

The grounds for rejection of wiring/cargo door explanation are faulty and contradicted by NTSB evidence of Exhibit and database.

So, what to do? Hide, run for cover, ignore it, pretend it doesn't exist, attack the messenger, circle the wagons? Or do the right thing, the thing you were trained to do, swore to do, paid to do, want to do, find out why planes crash so they won't crash again, and to do that you need to find out why TWA 800 crashed and to do that you must do the aircraft investigator thing, check out all the plausible explanations and rule them in or rule them out.

To rule out wiring/cargo door, you know more needs to be done

than a few sentences after examination of less than fifty percent of the many pieces of the forward cargo door.

To rule out the open door inflight you need more than a condescending sentence about it by Chairman Hall at the Dec 97 Baltimore hearings, or a few sentences by Dr. Loeb at the 23 Aug 00, hearing, or a short exhibit by Mr. Wildey about the bottom sill.

UAL 811 is the model again for proper AAR for examination of a forward cargo door suspected of coming open in flight.

The first step is to talk to me and confront me with all the data and evidence you believe rules out open cargo door in flight, and eight of ten latches in hand is not good enough. Especially since the two midspan latches of UAL 811 were never recovered either.

What is the personal angle to this? Why did Mr. Goelz say I was 'peddling' wiring/cargo door explanation for profit? Why is wiring/cargo door explanation given NTSB worth equal to 'plane too heavy to fly that day'? Why am I referred to as 'A member of the public."

Why the constant denigration of the messenger and never professional queries about the message?

Where are the technical questions of accidents using acronyms of PSI, FS, IAS, MSL, NM? I know the questions that open minds ask because I have been answering them from my web site to the hundreds of pilots and other who email me discussing the wiring/cargo door explanation. I know that dozens of FAA and NTSB and Boeing computers have been logging on to corazon.com

thousands of times over the past four years because I have the IP resolved of visiting computers below from previous month statistics:

760:	0.78%:	blv-proxy-01.boeing.com
329:	0.31%:	blv-proxy-02.boeing.com
467:	0.60%:	blv-proxy-03.boeing.com
483:	0.41%:	blv-proxy-04.boeing.com
253:	0.31%:	blv-proxy-05.boeing.com
12:	0.01%:	blv-proxy-06.boeing.com
74:	0.14%:	svifw02.lgb.cal.boeing.com
2:	:	proxy-le0.cal.boeing.com
41:	0.04%:	stl-proxy-01.stl.mo.boeing.com
37:	0.04%:	svwww007.stl.mo.boeing.com
25:	0.02%:	svwww008.stl.mo.boeing.com
65:	0.05%:	slb-proxy-01.boeing.com
108:	0.09%:	www-fw-proxy1.boeing.com
123:	0.09%:	www-fw-proxy2.boeing.com
77:	0.05%:	www-fw-proxy3.boeing.com
373:	0.33%:	www-fw-proxy4.boeing.com
121:	0.11%:	www-fw-proxy5.boeing.com
11:	0.01%:	firewall.ntsb.gov
3:	:	awaproxy.faa.gov
216:	0.30%:	enduser.faa.gov

I know the closed mind questions and they are usually the conspiracy guys with all capitals, obscenities, misspellings, multiple exclamation marks, anonymous, and question/statement full of error, misstatements, and accusations.

I'm not getting the open minded questions from NTSB but am getting some of the closed mind responses.

I will say this to Chairman Hall, who asked plaintively at the Dec

99 hearing words to the effect, "Why were the passengers above and near the center fuel tank not burned?"

I answer you now, Chairman Hall, as I did then in an email, "They were not burned because they were not there to be burned when the center tank exploded. They had previously been ejected into the air after the nose came off from the huge hole on the starboard side where the cargo door used to be. None of the parts recovered in that nose has sooting. Only later, when the noseless fuselage is falling and the wings and fuel tank are coming apart, and the on fire number three engines is spinning and falling too, do the two meet, ignite, and explode.

The big and little mysteries that are left hanging with the wiring/ center tank explanation are explained with the wiring/cargo door explanation. Streak, ignition source, lack of burns, engine blade in right horizontal stabilizer, sooting on blades of engine number three.

By the way, the statement about all four engines operating normally until water impact is just as false as forward cargo door all latched and intact until water impact.

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were

recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

8. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all' of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight.

Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball.

More NTSB produced evidence of wiring/cargo door explanation being worthy of further investigation:
7. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

4. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

It's not too late to one more final investigation of a new scenario/ sequence that has emerged when given a new interpretation of current information, as the NTSB author of Exhibit 18A states.

Gentlemen, please do what you said you would do, are supposed to do, and want to do, check out all the plausible explanations for TWA 800, including wiring/cargo door explanation.

Cheers,

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US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Post TWA 800 hearing analysis**

Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2000 01:54:59 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Post TWA 800 hearing analysis
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
For NTSB: Dear Chairman Hall, Dr. Loeb, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Swaim, 24 August 2000

Copy for FAA: Dear Mr. .McSweeny Mr. Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman Mr. Streeter

You have done an extensive investigative job on TWA 800; extensive and expensive but not complete. You have prosecuted the center tank explosion as the initial event. You have defended your probable cause from missile or meteor or electromagnetic or bomb. But you have not defended it properly from wiring/cargo door explanation. You essentially offer the wiring/center tank explanation for TWA 800 which is refuted by photographic evidence of dark soot and suddenly non-soot whiteness on upper fuselage and smooth port and shattered starboard side just forward of the wing of TWA 800 reconstruction. A center tank explosion would do centered spherical sooting and shattering. The evidence shows unilateral starboard damage and a sudden break of the fuselage with no fire on one side. You have no ignition source after trying God with static electricity, pump manufacturer, and now mechanics drilling and not removing shavings.

Wiring/center tank explosion is not the initial event.

Wiring/cargo door is. The photographic evidence shows the shattered door and the outward ruptures at midspan latches. The ignition source for later center tank fire/explosion is the on fire engine number three, fodded because it is closest to the forward cargo door and would ingest foreign objects and catch fire should that door open or rupture in flight, as happened in UAL 811.

Well, the sound of the CVR and the visual of the wreckage all support wiring/cargo door, and yet, no investigation other than checking eight of ten latches of which there are twenty on that Boeing 747 in two identical cargo doors.

All latched and locked and door intact at water impact? Whose opinion is that? Certainly not an aircraft accident investigator.

That sounds like a metallurgist's opinion. Is it? Well, it's wrong. The door was shattered up high and the bottom eight latches of ten available may have been latched and locked at water impact but the midspan latches were long gone.
So, why was not the wiring/cargo door explanation given as much official attention and investigation as the wacky bomb, missile, EMG, and meteor explanations? Wiring/cargo door has happened before in similar type aircraft under similar conditions leaving similar forensic evidence on metal, tape, and paint and should have had priority.

So, after Senator John McCain personally asked Chairman Hall to discuss with me the wiring/cargo door explanation, and Chairman Hall declined, I have come to the conclusion that you are all ducking me, refusing to think, refusing to talk, refusing to listen, refusing to consider wiring/cargo door explanation. Is it because it leads to PA 103 and AI 182? Is it because it was NIH, not invented here, syndrome? Is it because you hate to admit you were wrong, even about small things? Is it fear? Fear that the wiring/cargo door explanation is correct and the implications are perceived as dire? Dire to who?

It's dire to passengers and crew if you're wrong, NTSB, and wiring pops a door...again, and again. It's dire to the manufacturer if it is shown that aging wiring is a problem in airliners. Wait, that's been done already by NTSB. There is nothing to fear anymore. The main problem has been identified: Aging wiring in aging aircraft.

On many main items we agree on TWA 800:

You say mechanical; I say so too
You say aging wiring is problem; I say so too.

Initial event is wiring short, I say so too.
You say catastrophic; I say so too.
You say no bomb or missile or meteor or electromagnetic interference; I say so too.

Only in details do we disagree:

Your suspect wiring is just aft of the wing leading edge and mine is just forward.
Initial event after wiring short is cargo door rupture and not spontaneous center tank explosion.
Center tank exploded later, ignited by on fire engine number three.
Nose came off after huge hole on starboard side appeared just forward of wing, (see NTSB photograph for shattered area.)
Streak is piece or pieces of door area of shiny metal reflecting evening orange sunlight to observers on ground as they spin away after explosive decompression.
Place of explosive decompression is the two midspan latches of forward cargo door, (see photos of midspan latches showing outward open petal rupture.)
http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html
http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html

Photo above shows a door that was not intact and latched at water impact but shattered and ruptured at midspan latches early on.

We are close in probable cause, but far enough away so that the suspect forward wiring is still there and not yet inspected and replaced if necessary when cracked, chafed, or worn to bare wire, as Poly X is wont to do.

Curious that, wiring was inspected in cargo doors of MD 11, fuel tanks of 747s, but not cargo doors of 747s, although cargo doors have opened in both designs but only the Boeing 747 has confirmed wiring/switch problems.

But, what now? Well, wait for another one to fall down I assume. 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1996 are the years of open cargo door in flight events for high time Boeing 747s that I am tracking. It's now 2000.

We will all know at the same time the cause of the next wiring/ cargo door event because it will follow such a predictable pattern:
Sudden loud sound on the CVR not matched to bomb but matched to explosive decompression. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Sudden power cut off to FDR and secondary transponder. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) More inflight damage on the right side of aircraft. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Forward cargo door found in pieces, aft door intact and latched. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Front section will be torn off from aft section. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Engine 3 fodded. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Damage start location in or near forward cargo hold. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) At least nine never recovered bodies of passengers and crew. (Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Wreckage plot areas will be front section, aft section, and engines with number three engine apart from other three. (Same as AI 182, and PA 103, and TWA 800.) Possible streak of departing door if sun angle and observers is aligned. (Just like TWA 800.) Aircraft will be a high time Boeing 747.

(Same as AI 182, UAL 811, and PA 103, and TWA 800.)
So, Gentlemen entrusted with the public safety in aviation, you have not properly ruled out open cargo door inflight for TWA 800 because you have refused to discuss the explanation with the leading advocate and discoverer of it, that's me, as well as not having the required evidence such as a smooth cargo door and all ten latches to substantiate your reason for ruling it out as:
Dr. Loeb of NTSB: "We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact."

That statement above is absolutely false, full of errors, and a wrong conclusion. All claims are refuted by official documents and photographs which were emailed to you yesterday.
Until you talk to me, you have not done your job of a complete aircraft accident investigation for TWA 800. And you know it after these long four years and hundreds of emails from me filled with facts such as analysis attached. I've included the analysis below to refute any accusation of weirdness, lack of research, faulty reasoning, and inaccuracy of facts presented by me. I'm not a missile guy or a bomb guy nor any conspiracy person. I'm the reasonable aviator who has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet crash and is saying that for several Boeing 747s, an event that happened before has happened again for TWA 800 and supports that plausible claim with extensive facts, data, and evidence.

Until you face, consider, and thoroughly investigate the wiring/ cargo door explanation for TWA 800, you have failed. You have failed your duty as public safety officials to whom media, manufacturers, and citizens look toward for a complete investigation. You did not do a complete investigation. You did a specialized prosecution of center tank explosion. The wiring/ cargo door explanation is still there, waiting for examination. And you know it. One exhibitin the Public docket and a sentence at a public hearing is not a complete investigation of a cause initially thought to the answer, forward cargo door opened in flight and ruled out within days based upon cursory examination of some but not all of the latches and some but not all of the cargo door.

I again challenge you, as NTSB officials, as public safety officials, to check out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 by interacting with the proponent, the one who knows the most about it. If your mind is changed in some areas, then the better for it; if not changed, then you may rest that you have done a complete job of investigation and the better for it also.

Sincerely,

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US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996."

Analysis by JBS>
1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine teardown facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton.
2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. A forensic powerplant teardown is likely to require several man hundred hours per engine with several thousand hours of metallographic back up work. Additionally many specialized tools are required to do this. There should be many thousands of feet of tape or pictures. Haste is evident in a one day teardown per engine in an empty hangar with only one engine specialist present.

Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine

(HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Analysis by JBS>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in this same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in this report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing and irregular FDR EPR readings.

Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples which are mainly irrelevant in a discussion about engines and teardown results. 33% of engine report is not about engines but about favored NTSB explanation of center tank fuel explosion as initial event.

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and

the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Analysis by JBS>Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all' of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight.
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had

partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball.

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame.

The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>

The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at<http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html> Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears.

The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals.

It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.

Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces.
Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report.
"RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting
RF3A-H These pieces are part of the
forward main cargo door.
Some have grimy corrosion

inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.
These pieces are part of the
forward main cargo door.
Some have grimy corrosion
inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.
RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting
RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting
RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting
RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting
RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting
RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting
RF8A No sooting No sooting
RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting
RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting
RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting
RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting
RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting
RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting
RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting
RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting"

NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.

14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than

identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:
1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty

foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800
John Barry Smith
11 Jan 98

Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff from hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door

at the aft midspan latch.
The nine foot by nine foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. Fuselage skin was torn vertically. The door fractured and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.
The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main

equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.
At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.
The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane. The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.
The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine

number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose.The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast directly, leaving a wide debris field.
Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris.
Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.
Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.
Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com

Subject: **Fwd: Wiring/cargo door explanation evidence**

Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2000 23:30:14 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Wiring/cargo door explanation evidence
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Statement of Dr. Bernard S. Loeb
TWA flight 800 Board Meeting
August 22, 2000

We found no evidence that a structural failure and decompression initiated the breakup. A thorough examination of the wreckage by our engineers and metallurgists did not reveal any evidence of fatigue, corrosion or any other structural fault that could have led to the breakup. As a side note, I would like to mention that there was absolutely no evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door -one of the many theories suggested to us by members of the public. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was closed and latched at water impact.

Dear Dr. Loeb and other members of NTSB, 22 August 2000

I have to refute the statement above by Dr. Loeb because it is refuted by NTSB facts below.

Side note on the side note: There was substantial evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door. The physical evidence demonstrated that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact.

Substantial evidence of an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door.: Chart 12 of the Public Docket for TWA 800 prepared by NTSB: This substantial historical evidence shows that when a cargo door opens on an early model Boeing 747 shortly after takeoff a sudden loud sound occurs on the cockpit voice recorder. It happened on UAL 811 as confirmed by NTSB in AAR 92/02. It matches TWA 800 historically.

What is the physical/forensic evidence to back up the historical evidence?

The physical evidence below demonstrated that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact. Forward cargo door is in shattered pieces with many pieces, still unrecovered in NTSB photo below. Forward cargo door has ten latches but only eight have been recovered. Physical evidence as prepared by the NTSB is in the wreckage reconstruction of TWA 800 and shows shattered starboard side around forward cargo door and then the smooth port side of TWA 800 forward of the wing.

Nose to right above.

Nose to left above.

HIgh Resolution photo below shows huge amount of forensic physical evidence that the forward cargo door was in many pieces at water impact. Note huge outward opening petal shaped rupture at the forward midspan latch, one of two without locking sectors, and which was never recovered.

Dear Dr. Loeb and members of NTSB, to conclude,

You know the wiring/cargo door theory/explanation is plausible because it's happened before and it was the first thing you thought of. You know that a lot of the things that happened to UAL 811 happened to TWA 800. You know what happened to UAL 811, open cargo door in flight, and it may very well have happened again. Yes, probably wiring shorting on unlatch motor, yes, the locking sectors should have been on all the latches, not just the bottom eight. Yes, the center tank exploded, on the way down, ignited by engine number three which was fodded and on fire, just like UAL 811.

To be fair, to live the truth that you are aircraft accident investigators intent on determining the best probable cause after examining in detail, including interviews, all submitted explanations for TWA 800 to include center tank explosion, bomb in forward cargo hold, missile anywhere, electromagnetic interference, meteor, and wiring caused open cargo door in flight, you would contact me, email me, call me, interrogate me, drain me of everything I know about cargo doors opening in flight in Boeing 747s. I know a lot. I learned it from NTSB documents. You have not talked to me but still can. To be fair, you must follow up on substantiated leads.. Chairman Hall referred to me and my cargo door explanation at the beginning of the December 1997 hearings in Baltimore; Dr. Loeb referred to me in his opening remarks at the public hearing today. Yet, you have not talked to me as you have to hundreds of others with information about TWA 800. Let me present the wiring/cargo door case. Let the evidence and analysis that I have researched and assembled

be allowed to stand and be examined.

To reject the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 without interviewing me, without giving scientific explanations for the photos and chart above, and without recovering and examining the missing latches is to have conducted an incomplete investigation which may very well have concluded with the incorrect initial event for the probable cause for TWA 800. You have not turned over every stone. In fact, you have refused to turn over a stone right here and which you initially thought might be the right one, and one which I am again pointing to; turn it over, open forward cargo door in flight. Let the historical and forensic evidence speak.

Regards,

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barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Photos of ruptures at latches of TWA 800/ wiring/cargo door explanation.**

Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2000 09:55:37 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Photos of ruptures at latches of TWA 800/wiring/cargo door explanation.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
Dear NTSB, you have not yet examined wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800. There are ten latches on that forward cargo door and you only have eight.

Below are high resolution photos of ruptures at midspan latches of TWA 800.

http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowuphoto.html

Forward midspan latch rupture, two photos.

http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html

Aft midspan latch rupture.

Final report in August? You have not yet thoroughly ruled out the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800. You have attempted without success to rule in spontaneous center tank fire explosion as initial event.

Streak is pieces of fuselage near cargo door area being blown out and away and reflecting evening sunlight to observers down below.

The is still time to complete the report.

Cheers
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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

At 2:20 AM -0400 6/5/00, AVweb's AVflash wrote:
...TO RULE THEM OUT AS CAUSE ONCE AND FOR ALL
The missiles were fired in April at Eglin Air Force Base near Fort Walton Beach, Fla., to determine whether streaks of light reported by
witnesses could have even been missiles and to establish a

baseline of
what might have been visible of a shoulder-fired missile. The NTSB
plans to hold a final hearing on the crash in late August, when it will
determine a "probable cause." AVweb's NewsWire coverage at
<http://www.avweb.com/newswire/news/news0023a.html> contains details of
a proposal the FAA is considering that would cost millions but might
prevent another TWA Flight 800.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Fwd: Sent June 97 and still valid, a real test for TWA 800 streak**

Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2000 17:29:28 -0700
To: NTSB
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Sent June 97 and still valid, a real test for TWA 800 streak
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:
To: DICKINAntsbgov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: It's not too late to get it right.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson,

The first anniversary of the crash of TWA 800 is less than two months away. Many will be looking at the spot in the sky in which the 747 destructed. I suggest a recreation to test a hypothesis that a piece of the plane came off and reflected evening sunlight as it spun away appearing as a streak to ground observers and to also confirm the metal piece could be picked up on primary ATC radar.

The security guys are very good at recreating what they believe happened, bombs and missiles. Planes are being blown up and missiles fired at other planes. Let the mechanical proponents have an exercise in recreation.

Based upon the TWA 800 streak and mysterious blip at the same time, both could be related. What hypothesis could explain both? Cargo door could. It would be cheap, safe, and easy to test that idea. In the evenings before the anniversary, observations could be made of regular 747s taking off from Kennedy and passing the event spot at 13700 feet at 300 IAS. The large, short duration, sun reflective flash can be observed off the 747's forward fuselage, moving to engines, aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and winglets if 747-400. I have observed this flash many time from my vantage point living under a heavily travelled airway from SF to LA.

On the anniversary evening a C-130 carrying spare old 747 cargo doors or metal object of same size and shapes could fly at 13700 feet as fast as it could go, about 220 IAS, and at 8:31 PM on 17 July, lower the C-130 inward opening aft door and the crew could push out the eight foot by nine foot pieces of shiny radar and sun reflective metal. ATC radar and ground observers could watch to see the track of the object as it slows down horizontally land speeds up vertically in a parabolic curve to the ocean surface. Radar tapes could then be analyzed to see if the

object matches the blips before TWA 800 disappearance off scope. Ground observers can be queried to see if observed streak matches the TWA 800 streak. Several passes could be made in the sun reflective window between 8:20 to 8:50 PM.

A mechanical hypothesis would have been tested in a non destructive, safe, cheap, repeatable manner, inadvertent fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side. When the streak and radar blip are recreated at the same time and place as TWA 800, a strong case can be made that some part of the airframe flew off just before destruction and two mysteries solved.

We are dealing with life and death here so any effort is worth it to stop the death from happening again.

My goal is easier than yours. My goal is to persuade you that a worthy line of investigation for crash cause of TWA 800 is hull rupture forward of the wing on right side around cargo door. Your difficult task, if you were persuaded to investigate rupture area, would be to prove or disprove that explanation.

The big picture: From identifying the forest, individual trees make sense. A single tree examined alone does not reveal much. Here are the Boeing 747 trees and the forest they belong to:

TWA 800 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

PA 103 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

AI 182 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

UAL 811 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

There are other high time Boeing 747 ruptured hull crashes but they were not solo and they involved getting hit by lightning or flying into the water, the ground, or another airplane.

The only three that match TWA 800 are the above alone, sudden, and fatal hull ruptures.

You are on the scene and have seen two of the planes involved, TWA 800 and UAL 811. I contend that had UAL 811 had its weakened nose torn off the sequence of destruction would match TWA 800. Could the weakened nose of 811 have torn off from

the 300 knots IAS?

My cargo door explanation is based on the central intelligence of the similarities in solo pressurized hull ruptures. They all have common consequences and leave similar evidence. I included for background reference in my research the three DC-10 cargo door events. Also included in research was PA 125, a Boeing 747 leaking pressurized hull event.

The DC-10 hull ruptures occurred in the aft fuselage as shown by the evidence after the crashes.

The four Boeing 747 hull ruptures and the one leaking hull have all been located to a small area on the large 747: Forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where a huge square hole has been cut into the pressurized hull; the outward opening cargo door.

Let's get specific:

UAL 811, NTSB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on right side.

AI 182, Indian report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on the right side.

PA 103, AAIB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on left side followed immediately by right side rupture.

TWA 800, early New York Times article stated computer simulation located rupture forward of the wing on the right side.

(Documentation of sources is on web site www.corazon.com)

Now to the causes of the solo pressurized hull ruptures of the four planes above: Ah, the causes. It seems that such similar events would have a similar cause but that is not the official position.

The causes have been stated in reports as:

AI 182 as bomb in forward cargo hold or door.

PA 103 as bomb in forward cargo hold.

UAL 811 as bomb or door.

TWA 800 as bomb in forward cargo hold, missile striking

forward of the wing on right side, fuel tank explosion severing nose forward of wing, or door.

If TWA 800 had been shown to be bomb then all would be right in the aircraft investigation world. Four catastrophic solo ruptures of 747s; three bombs and one door.

But TWA 800 has been shown not to be a bomb and all is not right in the aircraft investigation world. It doesn't make sense. Something's wrong. If 800 not a bomb, then maybe 103 and 183 not bombs? If not bomb, what?

Let's back up to big picture. The large forest of wide body solo hull ruptures includes three DC-10s and four Boeing 747s. The three DC-10s are definitely in the forest, but are the four Boeing 747s? What else is there to link them to include them as hull ruptures?

If the four Boeing 747 hull ruptures over eleven years can be shown to be extremely similar then they can be assumed to have one common cause. What is it?

I contend they are so similar that they have one common cause. The common cause is a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side. It sounds like a circle but that is an important point for us to agree on. Were there hull ruptures on the four planes and did they cause the accident? I say yes.

What caused the hull rupture at that location?

Well, every inch of that area must be examined closely. It is already a dangerous area. Section 41 retrofit was done to correct cracks near the rupture area. Several ADs were issued to correct faults in a door which may lead or did lead to a rupture in that area. The pear design at rupture location is not as strong as a circle or oval found aft, near identical door which has not failed in flight. Historically, hull ruptures have been near squarish corners of holes cut in the pressurized hull; there are squarish corners of a big hole in the rupture area.

Regarding TWA 800, I am assuming the fireball and center tank

explosion occurred after hull rupture, not before, based on eyewitness accounts of streak and altitude of fireball lower than that at rupture event. Radar data also supports hull rupture first, then, later and lower, center tank explosion. There was a hull rupture forward of the wing, severing the nose, the time and cause is unknown as this time. If the cause of the hull rupture for TWA 800, the streak, and the radar blip anomaly could all be explained by center tank explosion, and if the ignition source were known, then you would not have emailed me in exasperation about the latches being latched on the 800 door. Center tank explosion does not answer all the questions nor explain all the evidence and as an investigator you would like to have all the loose ends tied up. Me too.

NTSB has been right all along to say mechanical and center tank explosion. NTSB is still right and will be right, it was mechanical and there was a center tank explosion. There is no incompatibility.

Let's assume for purposes of this thoughtful reply, the fireball occurred later and lower than initial hull rupture.

A hull rupture would cause an explosive decompression which means a sudden loud sound.

1. There was a sudden loud sound on the four 747s CVRs.

A hull rupture would cause a large hole to open up forward of the wing on the right side.

2. There was a large hole on the right side, forward of the wing on the four 747s; the door hole and torn away associated fuselage skin.

At that rupture spot, a weakened nose could be torn off by the tremendous 300 knot slipstream and start a sequence after sudden loud decompression sound:

3. Power abruptly cut at main equipment compartment. All four had abrupt power cut.

4. Passengers sucked out of large hole and ingested into number

three engine. All four had at least nine missing, never recovered bodies.

5. Nose falls in dense area on surface. Nose fell in dense area on three planes, on other plane the nose stayed on.

6. Rest of plane disintegrates as it falls leaving wider spread debris pattern. Three had wide debris pattern for noseless planes, other plane kept nose on.

7. Engine number three FODs, catches fire and falls away to land alone. Three number three engines fell away to land separately, two were on fire. Number three engine FODDED on other plane but engine stayed on wing.

8. Inflight damage by debris more severe on right side. Three planes had more severe right side damage and maybe the fourth too.

9. All four planes had ground radar information at time of rupture. Three had nearby lone primary radar blip, the other might have had but was out of primary radar range.

Discussion: The abrupt power cut would prevent most information about the cause of the rupture from reaching alert lights, the FDR, ground control, or the crew. The streak of 800 was only because the light was such to reflect off the fuselage to ground observers. The other hull ruptures all occurred out of sight of land or at pitch dark.

(There are other similarities of the four not immediately connected to hull rupture: all were high time and took off at night, running behind schedule and with EPR gripes.)

I believe that that is enough significant similarities to state that the four high time Boeing 747 accidents were caused by hull rupture forward of the wing on right side.

If we agree on that, (and I'm sure we do for UAL 811 and AI 182, close on PA 103, and unknown on TWA 800,) then let us consider very closely what needs to be done to determine why hull ruptured.

What causes pressurized hulls to rupture? Lots of reasons. Overpressure caused by bomb or malfunctioning airconditioning, structural defects, design errors, pressure miscalculations, missile penetration, midair collision, faulty windows or doors, and metal fatigue. The evidence must match the exact explanation to be satisfactory.

Submarines and planes are similar in that pressure is a huge consideration and often underestimated. Subs sink when valves are installed backwards. Planes crash when windows pop.

Ruptured hulls have been around as long as they have been pressurized. The Comet lesson was not learned by the 747. The DC-10 lesson was not learned by the 747. Do not cut outward opening large square holes in pressurized hulls. If they are cut then the incredible pressure will eventually force it open or the continued use will weaken the structure to failure.

To say a solo hull rupture is caused by large door opening inadvertently or metal fatigue is just to refer to precedent. It's happened before. It's a normal working hypothesis.

To say hull rupture was caused by center tank explosion by unknown ignition source is to be speculative.

A 747 has never had a center tank explosion of unknown origin in good weather. A 747 has had a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side by an inadvertently opened cargo door. There have been three other very similar accidents and none was a center tank explosion. They all could be structural failure at the rupture zone.

If a worthy line of investigation into the hull rupture of TWA 800 is a center tank explosion, or a bomb, or a missile, then it is certainly a worthy line of investigation to rule in or rule out inadvertent door opening, or metal fatigue, or structural failure at rupture location, forward of wing on right side.

To rule in or rule out rupture cause requires close examination of fuselage metal at corners of door to see if it matches the metal

failure pattern of the corners of the squarish windows of the Comet. It requires close examination of the door latching mechanism to confirm the cam latches were latched around the locking pins. It requires examination of stringers, bulkheads, floor beams, skin, and panels for any preexisting failures. It requires close examination around lone mid span latch of door for failure. It requires examination of door seals for leaking and door frame for previous damage or out of rig condition.

Regarding the complex latching system of the forward cargo door: The problem is subtle. It is possible to say that the locking sectors of the door were in the locked position and yet, the door to be unlatched. The cam sectors around pins is the key item. Was the bottom of the 800 door sill attached to the door latches? Was the door found broken in pieces but unattached to any fuselage? Did the door break at the mid span point? Did the hinge at top of door tear away at corners? Were the locking sectors steel or aluminum?

The rupture evidence of the other crashes now becomes a help. The evidence at the rupture location of 800 can be compared with the evidence of 182, 103, and 811. For instance, the tearing pattern of the rupture location on right side of fuselage for 811 and 103 match almost perfectly, it may match 800 too.

The latch status of FCD of 182 and 103 were unreported, it needs to be determined.

Regarding TWA 800 specifically before fireball: All revealed evidence is consistent with hull rupture forward of wing caused by door failure:

1. Streak is shiny door departing in evening sun.
2. Radar blip is metal door reflecting primary radar energy.
3. Sudden loud sound is sudden loud decompression after door goes.
4. Engine number three would ignite disintegrating wing and fuselage into fireball.

After fireball, evidence is consistent with center tank explosion.

Soon to be revealed public docket should be very interesting to contemplate:

1. Engine breakdown report. (FOD on three?)
2. Item wreckage plot. (Door found where?)
3. CVR data. (Frequency match 103?)
4. FDR data. (Any EPR problems?)
5. Radar plots. (Blip close enough to be door?)
6. Photographs of reconstructed fuselage. (Pattern match 103?)
7. Crew conversation. (The last words of the 800 pilot were to initiate a pressure changing event just before his pressurized hull ruptured, "Climb.")

To summarize: A worthy line of investigation into the crash of TWA 800 is the examination of the rupture area forward of the wing on the right side; specifically the forward cargo door area, to rule out failure of door latching mechanism, or door frame at corners, or blow out at mid span, or other structural failure in fuselage. This recommendation is based upon striking similarities to three other solo ruptured fuselage accidents, none of which was a center tank explosion.

Please check out the cargo door area thoroughly for mechanical failures. Use hindsight and compare all aspects of the similar earlier crashes of AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 to TWA 800. Use history to refer to similar Comet crashes and DC-10 crashes.

Sudden catastrophic airplane crash: New boss same as the old boss: pressurized hull rupture.

Is it possible to determine in your mind, Mr. Dickinson, that TWA 800 had a hull rupture? Can you locate it? Can you offer some explanations? What needs to be done to confirm or rule out your explanations?

Let's talk by email or phone about airplane crashes, not necessarily TWA 800. That's certainly appropriate after a public appeal for information by the NTSB. There is much to discuss. I

am vitally interested in this probably because of my own military RA-5C crash in which my pilot died and I survived a night fatal fiery sudden jet crash.

We both have the same goal. Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan. Let us succeed and everyone will be happy up and down the line.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Wiring/cargo door for TWA 800**

Dear Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter
Someone will have to admit to being not exactly correct in former statements about the forward cargo door on TWA 800. Pride comes before a fall and every investigation has a 'fall

guy." (My vote is for Jim Wildey; just joking, Jim, we met and shook hands at the Baltimore hearing. I enjoyed and respect your opinions except for initial event of spontaneous center tank explosion.)

I ask Mr. Wildey to say that yes, based upon wreckage reconstruction showing shattered door and the fact that not all twenty of twenty door latches have been recovered, that forward cargo door could have ruptured in flight, . Twenty latches for two doors means each door has ten latches and they have not bee recovered. That's all I ask of Mr. Wildey, to say that yes, the door could have ruptured in flight. Then leave the cause why it opened for others to discern. Yes, some damage occurred when the fuselage hit the water leaving inward pillowing. Yes, eight latches have been recovered in a cargo door sill and they were latched. But, to rule out a possibility, there needs to be substantial evidence that the possibility could not have occurred, and with forward cargo door there is not substantial evidence that it did not rupture in flight because most of the hardware in the door is still missing. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that the door did rupture in flight based on photographs of actual ruptures in the TWA 800 door and the historical precedent of UAL 811.

I was not exactly correct for the cause of the ruptured cargo door and may still not be. I figured either pneumatic, hydraulic, electrical, crew, bomb, missile, center tank explosion, meteor, EMG, or other, to cause those midspan latches to rupture. Only electrical made sense because of UAL 811 but it was only after Baltimore and the great show that NTSB put on about aging aircraft and the faults of Poly X wiring did I now believe it was Poly X wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture in flight for TWA 800.

But I could be wrong. It could have been the center tank explosion that blew open that nearby door. I'm not adamant about the cause of the ruptured cargo door in flight, only that it did happen and was not all latched and all intact at water impact.

And therein lies the open mind perception: A center tank explosion could have ruptured that door to rupture, as the photos show. If the door ruptured in flight, then all plausible causes must be examined, and they have not been examined. Why reject an alleged event such at ruptured cargo door if the official version of spontaneous center tank explosion could have caused it?

Mr. Wildey, please state that based upon a new interpretation of existing facts, that a new sequence could be possible. The new sequence states that the center tank explosion was not the initial event and was a symptom, not a cause of the accident. The ruptured cargo door was a symptom, not a cause. The cause is Poly X wiring, a cause NTSB and FAA and Boeing and I all agree with.

Please indicate, Mr. Wildey, that after looking at the photographs and checking the number of latches that were recovered, that that door could have ruptured in flight. If you allow that, Mr. Wildey, that will allow the aircraft accident investigators to go back in to TWA 800 and consider an explosive decompression event when a huge hole appeared in fuselage, just forward of the wing.

Mr. Schalekamp can still say, yes, at first look, it did appear that the door showed an outward explosive force.

Can somebody ask Mr. Ron Schleede to come out of retirement and compare UAL 811 and TWA 800? Can Mr. Schleede have

the opportunity to reconsider his statement that a cargo door was locked and latched after only looking at one of two door sills and knowing that most of both doors are still missing including suspect latches at midspan? That conclusion of locked and latched was made just as the pieces of wreckage were being brought in and long before the reconstruction was complete showing the shattered door and missing pieces. He should be permitted an opportunity to reassess his opinion of all locked and latched based on current evidence.

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
>To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
>Subject: RE: TWA crash cause
>Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400

>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!
> ----------
>From: barry
>To: SCHLEDR
>Subject: TWA crash cause
>Date: Tuesday, 30 July, 1996 01:48

>http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html is my website for cargo door
>crash theory.

>To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
>From: barry@corazon.com
>Subject: Which cargo door and cam positions
>Cc:
>Bcc:
>X-Attachments:
>
>Mr. Schleede, thank you for your prompt response.

>>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!
>There are three cargo doors on TWA 800, which one are you talking about.
>The front cargo door is reported to be in pieces, your sentence above implies one piece which would means other than front cargo door checked.
>The lock sectors are locked, but the cams are unlocked. You do not mention cams.
> What are the positions of the cam locks of the forward cargo door?
John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT
Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.
Thanks for the interest.

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400
Encoding: 129 TEXT
Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came
off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by
the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items memtioned in your letter.
Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Mr. Dickinson, a depressurization event such as proposed for TWA 800 and experienced by UAL 811 was noticed by the crew and recorded on the CVR. That sudden loud sound on the CVR on TWA 800 and UAL 811 is the sudden outflow of air molecules trying to equalize the low pressure on the outside of the fuselage. Many of the door/hatch/access/panel/windows were recovered but many crucial ones are still missing and probably would indicate they came from the aircraft prior to the initial event. if recovered The 'red zone' is full of pieces of TWA 800 forward of the wing and from the forward cargo bay. The trajectory study indicates that the first objects to leave the aircraft came from forward of the wing. Mr. Dickinson, would you indicate that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 could have ruptured in flight? If you do that, the wiring/cargo door explanation may get the attention it deserves.

Somebody, please, own up to the obvious: That forward cargo door area of TWA 800 is shattered, it's wrecked, it shows inward

pillowing on the skin and shows outward petal shaped bulge rupture at midspan latches, it has paint smears, it has missing midspan latches as well as missing manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors and most of the skin. That door should be a focus of attention and receive the same type of examination as that received by the door of UAL 811 such as an extensive metallurgical testing and examination and report. And it's not there for TWA 800. It is for UAL 811 and NTSB AAR 90/01 and NTSB AAR 92/02. Bomb and missile and EMG are wacky, little supporting evidence, not plausible, but possible and were thus thoroughly investigated by NTSB. Wiring/cargo door is sane, common sense, has happened before, plausible, and has much evidence to support it and yet has not been thoroughly investigated but fobbed off with a few sentences which are not supported by facts. Why is that?

The door is a problem on TWA 800, it was a problem on UAL 811, it can be a problem in the future. The wiring around the cargo door area needs to be inspected for cracks in the insulation to bare wire. It's been done already for TWA 800 and yes, cracked insulation in the wire was found in the cargo door area. Inspection has not been done for other 747s. The FAA could issue an AD to inspect the wiring around the cargo door area for early model 747s, inspecting the areas of wiring which have been shown to be chafed to bare in the past for UAL 811 and TWA 800:

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.
(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)
-Random flaking of the topcoat.
-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.
Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A for TWA 800 continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A for TWA 800 continues, page 116:
"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."
(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.
Will a junior or senior safety official contact me? Can a senior safety official order an investigation into allegations supported by NTSB photos and public docket exhibits that the forward

cargo door of TWA 800 ruptured in flight? Can a senior safety official order wiring inspections in and around forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747s?

Can something be done? Somehow, can that forward cargo door and wiring be full investigated? Can someone call me to get it started? Sometime is better than no time. There is still time right now before the final report goes to press.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young-PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Can't have it both ways**

Dear Gentlemen Jim Hall, Bernard Loeb, Ron Schleede (Ret), Al Dickinson, Jim Wildey, Bob Swaim, and Misters McSweeny Mr. Ron Wojnar Mr. Dimtroff, Mr. Schalekamp, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Lyle Streeter

3 October 2000

TWA 800 explanation that rules out ruptured forward cargo door in flight contains a basic contradictory paradox which refutes the claim that it was all latched and all intact at water impact.

You will note in the photos above of the actual forward cargo door area of TWA 800 that contains outward petal shaped rupture opening at the midspan latch and also note the inward pillowing on the door and adjacent fuselage skin.

Well, it is impossible for the water impact to do the inward pillowing and the outward explosion at the same time at water impact. Your rejection of the wiring/cargo door explanation can't have it both ways and remain logical and plausible.

The wiring/cargo door explanation does remain plausible and logical: In flight rupture/opening of forward cargo door inflight at the midspan latches which caused outward petal shaped rupture, supported by paint smears and missing latches. Then the door shattered into the many pieces as shown by wreckage reconstruction. Then the water impact of the pieces which caused the inward pillowing of the pieces as shown by photo.

Rupture outward at latches in flight/shattering pieces/water impact pillowing on pieces.

That's the sequence that makes sense and does not contradict the laws of physics.

Your explanation of evidence above of inward pillowing and outward shattering at same time at water impact is a physical impossibility and strains the credulity and patience of any competent aircraft investigator.

You want it both ways, inward/outward, to support your explanation of spontaneous center tank explosion and to rule out wiring/cargo door explanation but you can't have it both ways if

you want to remain credible and keep the respect of the NTSB and FAA.

The evidence is above and can not be refuted. To continue to reject the wiring/cargo door explanation and not interview the messenger is not right. You can make it right by doing the thing that aviation accident investigators do, evaluate every reasonable explanation for a probable cause of an airplane accident. Wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is that reasonable explanation that has not been thoroughly evaluated and should be and can be.

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.
US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.
Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/ explosive decompression/inflight breakup**

Dear Mr. Young,

Please examine my data which directly relates to below study. I've attached my AAR for Air India Flight 182 as pdf file. Your engineers will be interested in my research.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

Earlier this year, the air transport industry completed the most comprehensive study ever undertaken into the effects of aging on aircraft systems, with a primary focus on electrical systems.

From that study, recommendations are being developed to further enhance the safety of air transportation. For operators of Boeing airplanes, I'm pleased to report that The Boeing Company has already done a considerable amount of upfront work to enable those recommendations to be readily integrated into airline practices and procedures.

The landmark two-year study was conducted by the Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee, which was established by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in January 1999.

Committee members were drawn from the airframe manufacturer, supplier, airline, and regulatory sides of the aviation industry. The committee focused on jetliners 20 or more years old, which include about 3,700 Boeing- and Douglas-designed airplanes worldwide. Five key tasks were undertaken: inspection of electrical systems of almost 100 older jetliners of various makes and models, review of electrical systems fleet history in light of service bulletins and airworthiness directives, evaluation of maintenance criteria to identify and correct any aging systems issues, review and updating of standard wiring practices, and review of training programs to ensure that they address aging electrical systems.

The committee uncovered no immediate fleet-safety-related issues, nor did it find any conditions in the wiring or other systems that were not already known by the industry. This is a strong validation of existing processes that call for regulators, manufacturers, and airlines to work together

and share information for the benefit of aviation safety.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **Let us meet to discuss my theory**

Russ Young
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group Communications
(425) 237-0223

Dear Mr. Young, in the light of the continuing investigation into China Airlines Flight 611, do you know see a reason to meet with me to discuss my theory? My web site has the continued matches to United Airlines Flight 811 and others.

I'm still here and still willing to talk about aviation safety. Can't hurt to listen now, can it? We are both on the same side.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: "Young, Russell" <Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com>
To: "'barry@corazon.com'" <barry@corazon.com>

Cc: "'Al Dickinson'" <dickina@ntsb.gov>
Subject: FW: For Russ Young of Boeing Safety Office
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1998 10:42:46 -0700
X-Priority: 3
MIME-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent e-mail message, as well as the hard copy you
sent by U.S. Mail.

Although I admire your interest in enhancing air safety, I see no reason
for us to meet to discuss your theories. A variety of qualified Boeing
employees -- including air safety investigators and structures engineers
-- have already examined your web site and read the materials you
distributed at the public hearing into TWA 800 last December in
Baltimore. I also know of at least two occasions when you have talked
with Boeing accident investigators about your theories. They have all
reached the same conclusion: your theories do not explain what happened
to Pan Am 103 or Air India 182, nor are they consistent with what is
known about TWA 800.

The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation into the TWA

800 tragedy continues, with Boeing participating as a party to the investigation. If you have any new information that you have not already shared with the NTSB, I suggest that you contact the investigator-in-charge, Al Dickinson.

Russ
Russ Young
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group Communications
(425) 237-0223

From: John Barry Smith <fly@montereypeninsulaairport.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: "Boeing Communications"
<boeingreception2006@hotmail.com>
Subject: **Re: Boeing Reception RSVP**

At 1:45 PM -0500 10/10/06, Boeing Communications wrote:
Good afternoon!

Hopefully you received the invite that we mailed you to the Annual
Boeing Communications Reception. It's coming up next week and have not
heard if you're going to be able to join us.

Please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible to let me know if you
will be able to attend. You are welcome to bring guests.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17th
6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209

Metro: Rosslyn

Thank you for your invite, Jennifer, I will be unable to attend since I am trying to report a serious safety issue to Boeing for early model Boeing 747s. Please forward this email to safety officials at Boeing. Faulty Poly X wiring is causing ruptured open cargo doors in flight leading to fatalities. I wish to report in detail the specifics to a Boeing safety expert.

http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand ninety four of the supporting files; you created the aircraft; you know the design errors of no locking sectors for the midspan latches, you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and subsequent replacing the faulty wiring and changing the non plug doors to plug type.

Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/ cargo door explanation.

Boeing 747

Shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800.

A Plea to those government officials who have the responsibility to protect the lives of passengers and crew of airliners by oversight of the airlines, the manufacturer, and the parts suppliers: FAA and NTSB of the United States:

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You have visited ntsb.org and/or montereypeninsulaairport.com and read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded four thousand eight hundred fifty eight of the supporting files; you understand the science behind the logic, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate probable causes, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and your specialized agencies. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand ninety four of the supporting files; you created the aircraft; you know the design errors of no locking sectors for the midspan latches, you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and subsequent replacing the faulty wiring and changing the non plug doors to plug type. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the parts suppliers to the manufacturer of the aircraft:

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand forty six of the supporting files; you created the engines and structure; you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and you staff. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the airlines that fly aircraft with aging wiring and non plug cargo doors, in particular those airlines that fly early model Boeing 747s.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded twelve thousand six hundred fifty one of the supporting files; you fly the aircraft; you risk the lives of your staff and passengers every day, you are aware of the aging wiring

problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you.

NTSB.org statistics host report 11 sep 06 detailing the host computers who visit the website and how many files they downloaded over a one year time span. Ninety percent of the host computers were unlisted and not reported below.

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Map
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From: John Barry Smith <fly@montereypeninsulaairport.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: "Boeing Communications"
<boeingreception2006@hotmail.com>
Subject: **Re: Boeing Reception RSVP**

At 1:45 PM -0500 10/10/06, Boeing Communications wrote:

Good afternoon!

Hopefully you received the invite that we mailed you to the Annual
Boeing Communications Reception. It's coming up next week and have not
heard if you're going to be able to join us.

Please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible to let me know if you
will be able to attend. You are welcome to bring guests.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17th
6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209
Metro: Rosslyn

Free Parking Available at Boeing Building Enter on Lynn Street

Call Jennifer with any questions: 703-465-3663

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Thank you for your invite, Jennifer, I will be unable to attend since I am trying to report a serious safety issue to Boeing for early model Boeing 747s. Please forward this email to safety officials at Boeing. Faulty Poly X wiring is causing ruptured

open cargo doors in flight leading to fatalities. I wish to report in detail the specifics to a Boeing safety expert.

http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
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A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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Boeing 747

Shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo

door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800.

A Plea to those government officials who have the responsibility to protect the lives of passengers and crew of airliners by oversight of the airlines, the manufacturer, and the parts suppliers: FAA and NTSB of the United States:

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A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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A Plea to the parts suppliers to the manufacturer of the aircraft:

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A Plea to the airlines that fly aircraft with aging wiring and non plug cargo doors, in particular those airlines that fly early model Boeing 747s.

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From: John Barry Smith <fly@montereypeninsulaairport.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: "Boeing Communications" <boeingreception2006@hotmail.com>
Subject: **Re: Boeing Reception RSVP**

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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17th
6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209
Metro: Rosslyn

Free Parking Available at Boeing Building Enter on Lynn Street

Call Jennifer with any questions: 703-465-3663

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http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
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A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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Boeing 747

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From: John Barry Smith <fly@montereypeninsulaairport.com>
Date: September 6, 2009 12:03:03 AM PDT
To: "Boeing Communications"
<boeingreception2006@hotmail.com>
Subject: **Re: Boeing Reception RSVP**

At 1:45 PM -0500 10/10/06, Boeing Communications wrote:
Good afternoon!

Hopefully you received the invite that we mailed you to the Annual
Boeing Communications Reception. It's coming up next week and have not
heard if you're going to be able to join us.

Please reply to this e-mail as soon as possible to let me know if

you
will be able to attend. You are welcome to bring guests.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17th
6:00 pm - 8:30 pm

1200 Wilson Blvd, Arlington, VA 22209
Metro: Rosslyn

Free Parking Available at Boeing Building Enter on Lynn Street

Call Jennifer with any questions: 703-465-3663

Thank you for your invite, Jennifer, I will be unable to attend since I am trying to report a serious safety issue to Boeing for early model Boeing 747s. Please forward this email to safety officials at Boeing. Faulty Poly X wiring is causing ruptured open cargo doors in flight leading to fatalities. I wish to report in detail the specifics to a Boeing safety expert.

http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell

barry@johnbarrysmith.com
http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand ninety four of the supporting files; you created the aircraft; you know the design errors of no locking sectors for the midspan latches, you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and subsequent replacing the faulty wiring and changing the non plug doors to plug type. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

Boeing 747

Shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800.

A Plea to those government officials who have the responsibility to protect the lives of passengers and crew of airliners by oversight of the airlines, the manufacturer, and the parts suppliers: FAA and NTSB of the United States:

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You have visited ntsb.org and/or montereypeninsulaairport.com and read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded four thousand eight hundred fifty eight of the supporting files; you understand the science behind the logic, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate probable causes, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and your specialized agencies. Please

inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the manufacturer of the early model Boeing 747s that suffer inflight breakups: Boeing with facilities in Long Beach, Seattle, and Chicago.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight

breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand ninety four of the supporting files; you created the aircraft; you know the design errors of no locking sectors for the midspan latches, you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and subsequent replacing the faulty wiring and changing the non plug doors to plug type. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/ cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the parts suppliers to the manufacturer of the aircraft:

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded two thousand forty six of the supporting files; you created the engines and structure; you realize the risk of non plug doors, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you and you staff. Please inquire and ask questions to rule in or rule out the wiring/cargo door explanation.

A Plea to the airlines that fly aircraft with aging wiring and non plug cargo doors, in particular those airlines that fly early model Boeing 747s.

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You have read my shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for several early model Boeing 747s; you have downloaded twelve thousand six hundred fifty one of the supporting files; you fly the aircraft; you risk the lives of your staff and passengers every day, you are aware of the aging wiring problems, you understand the science behind the logic of explosive decompression, you can see the reasoning based on precedent, you remember the history of other aviation accidents, you have learned how to evaluate risk/reward issues, thus you know that the explanation makes sense. The wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further investigation by you.

NTSB.org statistics host report 11 sep 06 detailing the host computers who visit the website and how many files they downloaded over a one year time span. Ninety percent of the host computers were unlisted and not reported below.

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From: Google Alerts <googlealerts-noreply@google.com>
Date: September 19, 2009 12:21:42 PM PDT
To: barry@johnbarrysmith.com
Subject: **Google Alert - TWA Flight 800**

Google News Alert for: **TWA Flight 800**

FAA Chief Clarifies Who Is a 'Customer'
Wall Street Journal (blog) - New York,NY,USA
That changed after two high-profile crashes in 1996 – one involving a Valujet Airlines plane, another involving **TWA Flight 800** – prompted Congress to pass **...**

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From: Richard Mudgett <rlee2391mudz@sbcglobal.net>
Date: October 23, 2009 6:58:46 AM PDT
To: Rick Royce <lockloader@verizon.net>

Subject: **Fw: Super Connie CF-TGE transport to Seattle**

Good looking A/C.

Wednesday, October 21, 2009 9:28 AM
To: Undisclosed-Recipient:;
Subject: Connie CF-TGE transport to Seattle

A story with a happy ending !!!

From Bob Goff

C

http://www.rbogash.com/Connie/connie-RME-SEA.html